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Abstract 
Islamic mysticism has been the main focus of many Muslim philosophers and 
theologians. Great philosophers such as Avicenna and al-Ghazālī have dedicated part 
of their works to Islamic mysticism. They strove to clarify the meaning, goals and 
framework of Islamic mysticism. Avicenna presents Islamic mysticism as an 
intellectual journey that begins with the human and advances toward the Truth. The 
Truth for Avicenna is absolute being (wujūd muțlaq), which is equivalent with his 
philosophical definition of the Truth. This philosophical-mystical journey is a kind of 
psychological-mental journey. By psychological-mental I mean that the journey takes 
part and flows between different levels of the human psyche, for example from the 
potential intellect to the active intellect.  
Al-Ghazālī argues that Islamic mysticism is a Qur’anic journey that starts from the 
human and advances toward the Truth. In other words, the Qur’anic journey is a 
journey closely associated with the Qur’an. The Truth for al-Ghazālī is the Light of 
Lights. Al-Ghazālī ’s journey toward the Truth requires the combination of physical 
and mental structures. For example, the seeker of the Truth should obey Islamic law 
by praying and fasting; however, the seeker must also focus on and remember the 
attributes of the Truth with his heart.  
This comparison of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī illuminates that both Avicenna and al-
Ghazālī have observed Islamic mysticism from the philosophical perspective. Also, 
both understand the Qur’an in a philosophical and mystical context. 
This thesis offers a new perspective of Islamic mysticism by comparing Avicenna and 
al-Ghazālī ’s work and their integration of key elements of Islamic mysticism. 
Keywords: Avicenna, Al-Ghazālī, The Truth, The division of world, The division 
of people, Verse Nūr. 
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Introduction 
The study of mysticism in the Islamic context is known as Sufism. Various cultural and 
societal factors have shaped many distinct forms of Islamic mysticism. The main concern 
of this research is analyzing and understanding philosophical Islamic mysticism 
according to Avicenna1 and Al-Ghazālī2, two great Muslim philosophers. They analyzed 
Islamic mysticism from a philosophical perspective, and as a result the general 
framework of their mystical systems draw heavily on philosophy. 
 Avicenna is famous for his system of thought. The majority of Avicenna’s research and 
work focused on interpreting and understanding Aristotelian ideology. Furthermore, 
Avicenna studied and analyzed the schools of Neo-Platonism. Though the main focus or 
goal of his system was not the interpretation of the Greek philosophers, he drew on 
various sources and selected what he considered to be material that supported his own 
views. Thus, his system brings together Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, Farabianism and 
other Greek and Islamic ideas.3 
Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the major books of Avicenna, such as Kitab al-
Shīfā' (Healing), Al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt (Remarks and Admonitions), and Kitāb al-
Najāt (The Book of Salvation) do not have any connection with Islamic mysticism. 
Instead, these books demonstrate Avicenna’s exploration of different subjects, such as 
logic, mathematics, natural sciences, philosophy and theology. The theological aspects of 
Avicenna’s books describe and justify key Islamic theological issues: for example, the 
                                                 
1.Persian polymath, Ibn Sīnā or Avicenna (980-1037 C.E), was born in Afshanah (a small village 
neighboring Bukhara, the Capital of the Sāmānid dynasty). It is important to mention that the Latinized 
name of Ibn Sīnā, Avicenna, is more well-known than his Arabic name among scholars. 
2.Al-Ghazālī (1058-111 C.E) was a Persian medieval theologian, jurist, philosopher and mystic. 
He was born in Tabaran, a town in the district of Tus, Khorasan (today part of Iran). It should be clarified 
that Arabic name of Al-Ghazālī is more well-known than his Latinized name, Algazelus, among scholars.  
 3. Seyyed Hossein
 
Nasr and Oliver Leaman, (2003), 232. 
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essence and attributes of God. Specifically, this thesis will explore Avicenna’s work on 
mysticism in the last three chapters of Remarks and Admonitions. 
In chapters nine and ten of Remarks and Admonitions, Avicenna elucidates the meaning 
of gnosis and the gnostic. Also, he outlines some fundamental attributes of the gnostics 
(ʿārif) to distinguish the gnostic from the worshipper (ʿābid)—a person who prays often 
through imitation—and from the ascetic (zāhid)—a person who does not pay attention to 
material life and lives in seclusion. 
The goal of philosophical Islamic mysticism is the effort of gnostics (ʿārif) to acquire 
gnosis (ʿīrfān) by drawing on a philosophical foundation. According to Plato’s definition 
of gnosis, it is virtually synonymous with spiritual enlightenment. Gnosis, however, is not 
ordinary knowledge; rather, it connotes the direct experience of divine reality. As such, it 
is esoteric or secret to the worldly person because he or she does not possess "the eyes to 
see or the ears to hear;" the intuitive faculties are not yet awakened. Nevertheless, this 
knowledge is accessible to all who earn their way within its sacred limits. Gnosis is also 
esoteric, that is, "saving" or healing in the sense of bestowing wholeness: it carries the 
power to transform and reintegrate one's life into new life. Faith alone cannot save; one 
must also know and practice redemption. Also, Plato wrote about the inner reaches of 
gnosis. He explained: 
This knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; 
but after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of 
the subject, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in 
the soul and straightway nourishes itself.4  
The key word here, “gnosis,” is important to clarify because it is a Greek word that has 
been translated by Muslim philosophers. The Arabic translation of “gnostics” and 
“gnosis” are ʿĀrif and ʿīrfān, respectively. The Arabic translation of “gnostics” means a 
                                                 
4. Plato, Seventh Letter (1966), 341. 
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person who has special knowledge, and this special knowledge is gnosis.  Avicenna and 
al-Ghazālī chose gnosis and gnostics rather than Sufi and Sufism to distinguish 
philosophical Islamic mysticism from Sufism because Sufism embraces all forms of 
Islamic mysticism.  
 With all of this in mind, the main questions become: What turned Avicenna’s attention 
toward philosophical Islamic mysticism? What sparked his interest in philosophical 
mysticism? 
Studying the works of Avicenna and his autobiography reveals evidence of the work of 
Ikhwān al-safā’— a mystical sect from Shiite. In his autobiography, Avicenna confesses 
that his father and his brother were interested in Ismāīlī and tried to make him familiar 
with the viewpoint of this mystical sect.5 The effect of Ikhwān al-safā’6 on Avicenna is 
fundamental to understanding love in terms of Islamic mysticism. Love is an important 
concept because the study of Islamic mysticism centers on the love between beloved, the 
absolute Truth, and lover. 
Also, it is clear that the book Remarks and Admonitions was written by Avicenna later in 
his life, resulting in a combination of his teachings on logic, philosophy and mysticism. 
The first reason for this is that Avicenna divides this book into twenty chapters, with the 
first ten chapters allocated to Aristotelian logic. The next ten chapters explore philosophy 
and mysticism. The surprising aspect of this book is that Avicenna makes important 
connections to mysticism that are not found in his other works, such as Kitāb al-Shifā' 
and Kitāb al-Najāt. 
Another indication that Avicenna wrote Remarks and Admonitions later in life is his 
integration of mysticism as seen in Oriental Philosophy, which examines Islamic 
                                                 
 5. William E. Gohlman, (1974), 19. 
 6. From the 4th until the 10th century, coinciding with the first century of Fatimid rule, the Ikhwan 
al-Safa' were an anonymous gnostics of scholars who compiled the Rasā’il al-Ikhwān al-safā’ (Treatises of 
the Brethren of Purity), an Islamic encyclopedia. Ikhwān al- Ṣafā is connected with the Ismaili movement, 
which wrote the “Epistles of the Sincere Brethren” in order to propagate the Ismaili’s ideas about the 
reconciliation of philosophical and religious truth. 
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mysticism and was also written later in Avicenna’s career. Oriental Philosophy is crucial 
because it shows how Avicenna converted from pure philosophy to mysticism. Also, 
according to Henry Corbin, Oriental Philosophy is Avicenna’s personal doctrine, ḥikma.7 
The reason this thesis focuses on Remarks and Admonitions is that in the last three 
chapters of this book, especially chapters nine and ten, Avicenna expresses his ideas 
about Islamic mysticism clearly. In chapter nine, Avicenna explains the stages (maqāmāt) 
of the gnostics and the way humans can experience the Truth. In chapter ten, he describes 
the quality of the connection to the divine Kingdom and how a gnostic can receive 
revelations from God and experience union with God. 
In addition to examining Remarks and Admonitions by Avicenna, I will give equal focus 
to al-Ghazālī. The well-known (Ashʿarīte)8 theologian, al-Ghazālī, was introduced to the 
Islamic Empire through his text Incoherence of the Philosophers. This book illustrates his 
philosophical framework. In it, he critiques the Muslim philosophers who follow the 
Aristotelian school, paying particular attention to Avicenna. His main criticism is leveled 
against the theorem of cause and effect. Muslim philosophers use this theorem to try to 
prove the existence of God by considering the invalidity of the endless chain of cause and 
effect. Al-Ghazālī was a harsh critic of the Aristotelian school and its followers. As a 
result, he tried to establish his own philosophical foundation based upon only Islamic 
sources: the Qur’an and Hadith.  
 After spending years as a professor at the University of Baghdad, al-Ghazālī began to 
question his faith. When al-Ghazālī experienced this skepticism, he left behind his fame, 
social position, and even his family to find a remedy for his disease. His disillusionment 
can be considered a disease, as it negatively impacted both his mental and physical 
health. The question, then, becomes what revived al-Ghazālī after ten years of skepticism. 
The answer is Sufism. In his autobiography, al-Ghazālī explains that Sufism was the 
                                                 
 7. Henry Corbin, (1960), 272. 
 8. Ashʿarīte is the early theological school of Sunni Islam based on clerical authority and rejection 
of cause and effect reasoning. 
5 
 
  
remedy for his soul.9 Therefore, al-Ghazālī introduced Islamic mysticism as the best path 
to the experience the Truth. Also, he dedicated his life to writing many masterpieces on 
mysticism. The way in which he introduced Islamic mysticism is not separated from the 
Qur’an and Hadith. 
This thesis categorizes the mystical perspective of al-Ghazālī as philosophical mysticism 
because al-Ghazālī’s work has two distinct different periods. The earlier al-Ghazālī was a 
sharp critic of philosophers, especially Avicenna. However, the later al-Ghazālī was the 
Sufi who founded his mysticism by connecting it with philosophy and Qur’anic 
teachings. 
The Niche of Light (Mishkāt al-Anwār) was written by al-Ghazail after he recovered from 
his skepticism. This text introduces the spiritual path that must be followed to experience 
the Truth. In The Niche of Light, al-Ghazālī’s attempts two key undertakings.  On the one 
hand, he tries to interpret the Qur’anic verse Nūr in the mystical-philosophical context. 
On the other hand, he strives to make a strong connection between this verse and the 
prophet’s utterance. Al-Ghazālī describes and illustrates his mystical framework by 
building on the Qur’anic teaching. 
The goal of this research is to compare The Niche of Light (Mishkāt al-Anwār) by al-
Ghazālī and Avicenna’s Al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt (Remarks and Admonitions). However, 
before this comparison occurs, it is crucial to understand the philosophical frameworks of 
both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī and how they conceptualize mysticism as whole. As such, 
there are three points that require clarification: 1) the definition of the Truth as the 
primary love for the gnostics; 2) the division of the world; and 3) the division of people, 
including the seeker and the non-seeker. 
Therefore, the structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 will establish the outline of 
two paths toward Islamic mysticism according to Avicenna and al-Ghazālī and the 
reasons why Avicenna and al-Ghazālī address Islamic mysticism. Further, Chapter 1 is 
                                                 
 9. Al-Ghazālī, (1416 A.H), 541. 
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concerned with the subject of Love in Avicenna’s Ikhwān al-Ṣafā. Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review and analyzes the general framework of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s 
books, namely: Al-ishārāt wa al-tanbihāt (Remarks and Admonitions) and Mīshkāt al-
Anwār (The Niche of lights). Chapter 3 defines key terms and concepts in Islamic 
mysticism according to Avicenna and al-Ghazālī. Also, this chapter examines two 
different interpretations of the Qur’anic verse Nūr based on Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s 
doctrines.  
More specifically, Chapter 1 will shed light on the reasons why Avicenna and al-Ghazālī 
turned towards Islamic mysticism by exploring their personal life. Also, Chapter 1 will 
trace the philosophical-mysticism sect Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ and its impact on Avicenna’s life. 
This chapter will also analyze the differences between Avicenna’s and the philosophical-
mystical sect’s definition of Love. Chapter 2 is concerned with the general framework 
offered in Al-ishārāt wa al-tanbihāt and Mīshkāt al-Anwār. This chapter will analytically 
review Al-ishārāt wa al-tanbihāt and Mīshkāt al-Anwār by giving a comprehensive 
examination of the books. Also, the decision to focus on these two particular books will 
be explained. Chapter 3 moves from an exploration of the frameworks to a more detailed 
look at specific keywords. First, common keywords used by Avicenna and al-Ghazālī 
will be categorized in terms of Islamic mysticism. Then, similarities and differences in 
each category will be examined. Significant attention will be paid to how Avicenna and 
al-Ghazālī have a common semantical path but different terminologies. Another concern 
of this chapter is how Avicenna and al-Ghazālī engage with Islamic mysticism. For 
example, Avicenna relies on philosophy, whereas the primary texts drawn on by al-
Ghazālī are the Qur’an and Hadith, with philosophy playing a secondary role. This 
chapter will conclude with an interpretation of the Qur’anic verse Nūr according to 
Avicenna and al-Ghazālī. 
This research contributes new knowledge to the field, as it critically examines existing 
research on al-Ghazālī and Avicenna through both a philosophical and theological lens.10 
                                                 
 10. Some key examples include R.M. Frank’s Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazālī and 
Avicenna, published by Cambridge University Press; Monism and Monotheism in al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt al-
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Also, although previous authors have compared Avicenna and al-Ghazālī to show that  al-
Ghazālī borrows his philosophical doctrine from Avicenna, they fail to examine the 
similarities and differences between their doctrines.11 This research does not merely focus 
on how al-Ghazālī was inspired by Avicenna; rather, it concentrates on multiple points of 
similarity in their work and what makes Avicenna’s mysticism significantly different 
from al-Ghazālī’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
anwār, published by Edinburgh University Press; Maisonneuve and Larose’s Al-'Aql al-Qudsī: Avicenna's 
Subjective Theory of Knowledge; and Imagining the Divine: Ghazali on Imagination, Dreams, and 
Dreaming published by Oxford University Press. 
 11. Alexander Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī ’s Theory of Mystical 
Cognition and its Avicennian Foundation (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 64.  
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Chapter 1 
1 Two Paths Toward Islamic Mysticism: Avicenna and al-Ghazālī 
 The goal of this chapter is to examine the two different paths taken by Avicenna and al-
Ghazālī that led to their use mysticism. I will show that Avicenna and al-Ghazālī turned 
toward mysticism for different reasons, and that they advocated for mysticism because of 
their enjoyment of experiencing the Truth.  In order to understand why Avicenna and al-
Ghazālī converted to Islamic mysticism, one must grasp the influences of previous 
philosophers, theologians and other great scholars on their personal lives. For example, 
the effect of the Ikhwān al-safā' on Avicenna and the influence of al-Ghazālī’s 
teacher,  al-Juwayni12, were profound. 
In this chapter, I am not aiming to prove that the only origin of inspiration for Avicenna 
and al-Ghazālī was the Ikhwān al-safā' and al-Juwayni, respectively. I will compare the 
texts of Avicenna and the Ikhwān al-safā' to show that Avicenna’s view of love was same 
as taught by the Ikhwan al-safa'. I do not claim that Avicenna’s mysticism is directly 
borrowed from the Ikhwān al-safā’. However, their ideas of love are shockingly similar. 
Avicenna had read many philosophies, such as Aristotelian and Neoplatonism before he 
studied the Ikhwan al-safa'. Further, the system of thought of the Ikhwan al-safa' had 
been established based on Greek philosophers like Aristotle and Pythagoreans. Thus, I 
only can provide a similarity between Avicenna and the Ikhwan al-safa' on the subject of 
love. 
Avicenna has been considered the most influential Muslim philosopher, as his teachings 
have been embraced by the world. For example, in the Islamic world, many philosophers 
who came after Avicenna, such as Suhrawardi, Mirdamad, and Mullā Sadrā Shīrazī, 
                                                 
12.  Al-Juwayni was the Sufi master who had been teaching Al-Ghazālī.  
9 
 
  
were inspired by him. This impact of Avicenna demonstrates his philosophical 
adaptability and dedication to comprehending the universe from different lenses. 
Moreover, Avicenna is famous for his system that is considered a continuation of the 
Aristotelian school. An important point is that there is no evidence suggesting that 
Avicenna had read Aristotle’s texts or the comments on Aristotle’s work by the 
Neoplatonism school because the Neoplatonist system of thought was not pure 
philosophy. The Aristotelian school, on the other hand, holds a purely philosophical 
world-view without any explicit mystical world-view. However, Avicenna did write 
some mystical and symbolic stories and dedicated the last three chapters of his major 
work, Remarks and Admonitions, to Islamic mysticism later in his life. Yet, Avicenna’s 
mystical works have largely been ignored by scholars who focus instead on his major 
works like the cānūn, Remarks and Admonitions, and Shifāʾ, and the ways in which they 
interpret and apply Aristotelian philosophy and logic in an Islamic context.13  
Regarding al-Ghazālī, the goal of this chapter is not to show to what extent he was 
inspired by his teacher, al-Juwayni, because al-Ghazālī’s personal life shows his turn to 
Islamic mysticism clearly. Also, in his autobiography, al-Ghazālī elucidates the reasons 
he became Sufi clearly.   
Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, is a well-known Persian 
polymath and one of the most prominent and influential theologians to refute Muslim 
philosophers, and Avicenna in particular, for following the Aristotelian system of 
thinking. His major theological school was Ashʿarīte,14 which was one of the most 
effective and popular theological ideologies of the subsequent generation. His text, The 
                                                 
 13. By Islamic context I mean that Avicenna tries to interpret Aristotelian philosophy in 
accordance with the Qur’an.   
   14. An Islamic school of theological thought founded by Abu’l-Ḥasan Ašʿarī. This school 
provided critical arguments on key elements of Islamic theology such as the attributes of God, free will, 
predestination, etc.  
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Incoherence of the Philosophers, Tahâfut al-falâsifa, is a significant landmark in the 
history of philosophy. 
Further, al-Ghazālī’s judicial decrees were accepted by scholars and the populace because 
al-Ghazālī was a professor of Islamic law. In addition, Al-Ghazālī embraced Sufism and 
Islamic mysticism later in his life by writing several books about Islamic mysticism such 
as The Niche of Light, The Alchemy of Happiness, etc.  
1.1 Avicenna on Mysticism 
Avicenna had been exposed to different schools of thought like Aristotelian, 
Neoplatonism, and Farabiansim. However, he refused to adhere to any of their doctrines. 
Rather, he drew on various sources, selecting what he considered to be convincing and 
understandable.15 Therefore, he established his system of thought independently. 
Ibrahim Madkur, in the Introduction of (Ilāhīāt shifāʾ) Healing Theology, claims that 
Eastern scholars believed Avicenna’s system of thought leant towards the Aristotle 
school; however Western scholars considered Avicenna’s system as Neoplatonism.16 The 
diverse ideas around Avicenna’s system of thought reveals that his system cannot be 
categorized within specific philosophical schools. 
Four different traditions, each with its own diverse relations to Arabic religious sciences 
and their representatives, are drawn on by Avicenna for their extensive classical heritage 
of philosophy and science. But this thesis will focus on the second tradition, which is the 
impact of the Ikhwān al-safā’.   
                                                 
 15. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, (2003), 232. 
    16.Avicenna, (1402 A.H), 28-29. 
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1) The first group of traditions is associated with the earlier philosophic school of al- 
Kindī,17 which was largely devoted to a legal system. This group offered precise 
expression that targeted the ethical teachings of early philosophers and sages and what 
they saw as similarities to the ethical teachings of Islam. 
2) The second effective tradition was that of earlier Shiite philosopher-theologians, the 
Ikhwan al-safa'.18  
3) The third contemporary group was the scholarly commentators of Aristotle, heirs to 
the longstanding Hellenistic tradition (partially shared by the philosopher Al-Farabi19) in 
the older intellectual center of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad.  
(4 The connection between Avicenna and the scientist and polymath al-Bīrūnī, who 
happily pursued his scientific interests under the benevolent patronage of a zealous Sunni 
warlord, Maḥmūd Ghazna, considered as the fourth tradition.20  
 The fourth tradition is really important because in the epistles of Avicenna, there is an 
epistle concerned with answering the questions of al-Bīrūnī. This epistle contains the ten 
answers to the questions of al-Bīrūnī regarding astronomy, the soul, resurrection, the 
separation of the body and soul and the eternity of the soul.21 This epistle shows how 
much the discussion between al-Bīrūnī and Avicenna inspired Avicenna. 
                                                 
  17.Earlier Muslim philosophers who lived in the Islamic Empire, (c. 801–873 A.D). He was 
named the father of Muslim philosophy. 
 18. Ismaili, a philosophical-theological sect, expanded the resources of Hellenistic philosophic 
traditions to justify and defend the political and wider soteriological claims of a series of Imam, claiming 
rightful rule over the Muslim community.     
 19. Al- Farabi (872-950 A.D) was a famous Muslim philosopher. In the Islam Empire, he was 
considered a second Master after Aristotle. 
 20.Mahdi. Muhsin S, (1992), 153-155. 
 21.Avicenna, Epistles: Answering to al-Bīrūnī (Istanbul: Istanbul university, 1953). 
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The above list of influences shows how Avicenna's philosophy, logic, theology, and 
mysticism were shaped. However, the emphasis of this research is the formation of his 
mysticism in particular. 
Some orientalists claim that traces of the Shiites can be followed in Avicenna’s works. 
Hossein Nasr, for example, highlights the role of the Shiites in the formation of 
Avicenna’s mystical works. Nasr asserts that Avicenna was introduced to the  Ismaīlī by 
his father who was a member of this sect.22 
Henry Corbin alludes to Avicenna’s autobiography, highlighting that both Avicenna’s 
father and his brother were Shiite. Corbin also points to an analogy in structure between 
Avicenna’s and the Ikhwān al-safā's cosmology.23 However, Corbin does not examine 
whether Avicenna was inspired by the Ikhwān al-safā's framework or not, because, 
according to Corbin, Avicenna’s autobiography states that he refused to be a member of 
this mysterious sect.24 
The impact of the Ikhwān al-safā' on Avicenna’s formation of his mystical works is 
blurred because of the lack of evidence indicating that Avicenna was inspired by the 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’s works. Clearly, Avicenna himself claimed that his soul did not accept 
the Ikhwān al-safā's way of thinking. On the other hand, Avicenna’s definition of love is 
similar to that of the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’. 
Therefore, analyzing the definition of love as a keyword in philosophical Islamic 
mysticism between Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā by referring to their books is 
important. Clearly, I cannot claim that Avicenna was drawing on the teaching of the 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā because there is no clear evidence. However, an analysis of the texts 
does reveal similarities between two paths of thinking. 
                                                 
  22.Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, (2003), 232. 
  23. Henry Corbin, (1993), 170.    
24. William E. Gohlman, (1974), 19. 
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1.2 Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ on Love 
One of the most contested words in Islamic mysticism is ‘love’ (ʿishq), though not 
because of its meaning. The word ‘love’ has a deep and complicated context in Islamic 
mysticism because love embraces material and non-material objects. Thus, many Muslim 
philosophers such as Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ addressed the concept of love 
and considered it important for understanding Islamic mysticism.  Love is an important 
notion because it can lead to gnosis. Therefore, love means a union between lover and 
beloved, which for a mystic might refer to the union between God and believer. 
The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ were a group of Islamic scholars whose names have been concealed 
because of the political situation25 of their time. Hence, the identity of the members of the 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ have always been in question. This mysterious Muslim group compiled 
the famous work known as the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity (Rasāʾl Ikhwān al- 
Ṣafā’). 
It is worth giving a general illustration of the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, which is 
considered an Islamic encyclopedia; it includes topics such as: the Pythagorean theory 
and mathematics; numerology and music; hermetic science, Indo-Persian magic and 
astrology; Aristotelian physics and logic; and Gnostic esotericism. Additionally, it 
discusses Neoplatonic cosmology, the theory of emanations and metaphysics, Biblical 
and Qur’anic Propheteology, Platonic concepts of law and leadership, and Buddhist, 
Zoroastrian and Manichaean wisdom and allegory. The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’s preference for 
the descendant of Ali26 as the true leader of the Islamic community generally 
demonstrates Shiite, and more particularly Ismaili or Fatimid, affiliation. They not only 
depend heavily on Qur’anic verses and the stories of prophets, but also quote from the 
                                                 
25.The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā supported the Fatimid ruler (Shiite) while the Islamic Empire was 
governed by Abbasid leadership (Sunni), a strong opponent of Fatimid.  
26.Ali was the fourth caliph and the first Imam of Shiite. 
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Torah, the Psalms of David from the old and new testament, the Midrash and Talmud 
from Greek, Persian and Indian literature and have a great respect for Zoroaster, the 
Jewish prophets, and Jesus. 
The aim of this part of Chapter 1 is to explore the meaning of love used by the Rasāʾl 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ and its mystical meaning in Avicenna’s work.  
 The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’s sixth epistle27 is dedicated to love, and its essence, stages and title, 
The Quiddity of Love, shows the important role of love in Islamic mysticism. The sixth 
epistle commences with a definition of love according to the scholars.  However, the 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ did not clarify the identity of the scholars, or answer other questions 
such as whether they were Muslim or Greek. For example, The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ utilized 
the passive Arabic verb ‘qīla’ (is said), which does not indicate a subject, when they offer 
a definition of love according to the scholars. The reason for hiding the identity of those 
scholars by the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā is not clear. 
According to the sixth epistle, scholars defined love as human virtue (faḍilat al-insānī). 
Other scholars had defined love as a human illness, but the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ believed that 
these scholars lacked an awareness of the real definition of the concept. Some defined 
love as something that attracts attention of the lover to the beloved; in this case the lover 
cannot think or focus on anything but the beloved. Also, other scholars explained love as 
an intensive desire and affection.28  
The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’, after collecting the views of scholars about love, clarified the 
definition of love. Love, according to them, is the union between the lover and the 
beloved, which is a spiritual rather than corporeal union. The reason for denying the 
                                                 
27.Rasāʾl Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’, volume 3, chapter 2, epistle 6. 
28.Ikhwān al- Ṣafā. (1412A.H), Volume3, chapter2, 270. 
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corporeal union is that the union is a spiritual attribute and belongs to the reasonable soul 
( nafs nāṭiq).29 
The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ present a classification of love in the cosmos in which love 
emanates in the different stages of the cosmos. Basically, this kind of love is universal 
love and has an analogical gradation (tashkīkī). From the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’s perspective, 
the stages of the love are tantamount to the stages of the soul. The soul is categorized into 
three kinds: the vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the reasonable soul. Each of these 
souls has their own love, which is in harmony with their unique nature.30 
Some of them, the appetitive vegetative soul (Nafs nabātī) its love is nutriment, 
beverages and marriage. Some of them the animal emotional soul (Nafs ḥaywānī) 
and its love is severity, predominance and superintendence. And some of them the 
rational soul (Nafs Nātīq) and its love is comprehending the cognitions and 
acquire the virtues. Be aware my brother, there is no people who does not possess 
one of those kinds of love that mentioned.31  
The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā remarks that the reason for being in love with the object of love is 
that some of the creatures are causes and some others are effects. The nature of that 
which is the effect is to have a desire toward its cause, and the nature of the cause is to 
have affection and mercy upon its effect. They clarified their statement with an example 
of the relationship between older and younger people. 
The existents, some of them are cause and the other are effect. Some of them are 
initial and the other are secondary. Made in the natural inclination (Fițrah) of 
effects the tendency toward their cause, and desire toward them. Also, made in the 
natural disposition of causes mercy and affection upon their effect. As well, create 
                                                 
29.Ibid., 272-273. 
30.Ibid., 272. 
31.Ibid., 272. 
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this in the parents upon their children, and older toward younger, and the 
strongest existences toward the weakest existences. Because of the intensive need 
of the weakest toward the help of strongest existences.32  
The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ also differentiated between love (ʿishq) and affection (maḥabba). 
They argued that the number of things that can attract the affection of a lover is 
uncountable. Likewise, beings love something that has a significant amount of things in 
common with them. The appetitive soul, for instance, would not be attracted to severity 
and the understanding of cognitions is not the object of the love of the animal soul.33 To 
be exact, what can be understood from the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ is that there is a relationship 
between the stage of beings and their love. Also, we cannot neglect the connection 
between rationality and the stage of being. Therefore, we can come to the conclusion that 
there is a strong link between the rationality of beings and their love. 
 At the end of the sixth epistle, the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ introduced the real, trustworthy and 
singular reality (ḥaqīqa al-wāḥid) in the cosmos. This single reality for the Ikhwān al- 
Ṣafā’ is equal to the God of Islam, Allāh. The single reality is the only real object of love 
for every being. The main focus in the discussion of love is the Qur’anic verse, “Allah is 
the Light of the heavens and the earth.”34 In other words, Allah is the prime love and 
every being has a tendency toward him and would return toward him too.35 
Avicenna observes love as an analogical gradation subject. In this sense, love is a matter 
that embraces the whole cosmos and cannot be separated from the existence of beings. 
                                                 
32. Ibid., 277.  
تهمعلوالت، و منها أوائل و منها ثوان، جعلت في جبلة المعلوالت نزوعا نحالموجودات لما كان بعضها علال و بعضها  قا ا، و اشتياو عالا
ها تها رأفة و رحمة و تحنانا على معلوالتها، كما يوجد ذلك في اآلباء و األما ن الكبار مألوالد، و ت على اإليها، و جعلت أيضا في جبلة عالا
 .ة حاجة الضعفاء إلى معاونة األقوياء، و الصغار إلى الكبارعلى الصغار، و األقوياء على الضعفاء، لشد
33. Ibid., 278-279. 
34. Qur’an. 24:35. 
35. Ibid., 285-286. 
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This love causes the movement of the cosmos toward the single object of love: the First 
Cause.36 
The love toward the single beloved, the First Cause, circulates in the whole cosmos in 
different stages. Avicenna offers four different classifications of love. There is a 
similarity in the classification of love between Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’. 
However, Avicenna adds more options into his classification, which distinguishes him 
from the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’. For example, Avicenna believes in the love of non-living 
simple things (mujūd basīț ghayr al-ḥayy).  
Avicenna asserts that there is love between the non-living simple things such as the 
substance, the form and the property. This love among the non-living simple things is an 
instinctive attraction, which is the cause of their existence. Avicenna claims the matter 
only exists by the form, so there is an instinctive love between the matter and the form. 
The matter is like an old, ugly woman who cannot appear as herself without a mask, and 
the mask that she wears is the form.37  
Three classifications belong to the love of vegetative soul, according to Avicenna. The 
first beloved has three different faculties, and each faculty has its own love. 
The first beloved(maʾshūq) is divided into three segments (one of them) is the 
faculty of nutrition (and second) the faculty of growth (and third) the faculty of 
reproduction or procreation. Also, the love of the vegetative faculty is in three 
segments (one of them) dedicated to the faculty of nutrition and its origin of its 
love is the presence of food when it need to that food and its survival in nutritious 
after the natural digestion.  (and second) allocated to the faculty of growth and its 
origin of its love is gaining the more suitable nutrition (and third) dedicated to the 
                                                 
36. Avicenna. (1400 A.H) ,390. 
37. Ibid., 378-379. 
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faulty of reproduction, and the origin of its love is preparing the origin of being 
the same as itself. 38  
Another difference between Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ is the definition of love 
for the vegetative soul. The Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ did not describe the love of the faculty of 
vegetative in more detail. Moreover, the definition of the love for the animal soul makes 
Avicenna different from the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ as well. Avicenna highlights that the animal 
soul has two faculties: the faculty of anger (qhaḍabīyyh) and the appetitive (shsahwīyyh) 
faculty. The origin of the love of the faculty of anger is severity (intiqām), predominance 
(ghalabiah) and superintendence (ryāsat). There are two different kinds of love for the 
appetitive faculty: natural love (ʿishq țabīʾī), which is gained from the natural perfection; 
and optional love (ʿishq ikhtyārī), which is revealed in the compulsive situation. 
Avicenna makes his point about natural and optional love clear through an example. He 
says if the donkey which loves forages naturally sees the wolf, the donkey would escape 
because he loves to live more than eating forages. So, there are two desires (maʾshūq ) for 
the donkey, forages and life, and the former is natural love while the latter is optional 
love.39  
According to Avicenna, the origin of faculty for each human is a guidance toward love. 
Hence, if somebody thinks about the corporeal things they would love a corporeal 
beloved. Avicenna draws a triangle upon which each angle has a strong connection with 
other angles: the relationship between love, wisdom and beloved. This triangle, the love, 
                                                 
38. Ibid., 380. 
خاص بالقوة النباتية ك العشق الليد كذلإن النفوس النباتية تنقسم الى ثالثة أقسام )أحدها( قوة التغذية )و الثاني( قوة التنمية )و الثالث( قوة التو
ستحالته عد اغتذى بفى الم على أقسام ثالثة )أحدها( يختص بالقوى المغذية و هو مبدأ شوقه الى حضور الغذاء عند حاجة المادة اليه و بقائه
قوة المولدة ( يختص بالالثالث الى طبيعته )و الثاني( يختص بالقوة المنمية و هو مبدأ شوقه الى تحصيل الزيادة المناسبة فى أقطار المغتذى )و
 .تهيئة مبدأ كائن مثل الذي هو منهو هو مبدأ شوقه الى 
39. Ibid., 380-382. 
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the thinking and the stage of being, is the epistemology of love in Avicenna.  When 
humans think deeply, they would love deeply and this stage would rise in the cosmos.40 
Some common ideas can be found in a comparison between Avicenna and Ikhwān al- 
Ṣafā’. First of all, there is a similar approach to the classification of love between 
Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’. Both observe the presence of love in the vegetative, 
animal and reasonable soul. Secondly, both Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ believe 
that love is an analogical gradation. Furthermore, the prime love for Avicenna and the 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ is the First Cause and Allāh, respectively. The First Cause as the object 
of the love of all being shows that Avicenna does not like to separate himself from 
philosophy.41 Also, it indicates that Avicenna’s mysticism is not concerned with religious 
structures. Rather, his understanding of mysticism is built upon a philosophical 
foundation.42 
It can be questioned that if Avicenna’s system of mysticism does not have a connection 
with religious structures, perhaps he is merely claiming to be Sufi while working to 
violate religious structures. The answer is that a person who is looking for the Truth and 
to experience non-material enjoyment would not be focused on worldly enjoyment. 
The most debated subject regarding Avicenna’s explanation of love is not the similarity 
of his classification to the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ or the relationship between love and the 
stages of being. Avicenna, on page 393 of The Love Epistle, after a long comment and 
explanation about love, as mentioned above, claims the union with the first object of love 
                                                 
40. Ibid., 389. 
41. What I mean by “Avicenna does not want to separate himself from philosophy” is that his 
mysticism does not have any connection with religion. The object of the love of whole cosmos is the First 
Cause rather than Allah, the God of Islam.  
42.Both Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ used the same source of Aristotle psychology (De 
Anima). 
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is the meaning of love. Union with the first object of love is the idea that led the Ikhwān 
al- Ṣafā’ to allocate the sixth epistle to the essence of love. 
Our goal in this chapter is, to explain that every being loves the Absolute Good 
with natural love, the Absolute Good would not illuminate for its lovers unless its 
lovers accept its illumination and join to its illumination according to their 
differences. In reality, the close target from the object of love is accepting its 
illumination base on reality, I mean as perfectly as possible and this is the 
meaning that some sect of Sufis called union, because of the excellence of the 
love, the lover receives its illumination and verily the existence of things by it 
illumination.43  
The most interesting point here is that Avicenna did not reveal the identity of the Sufis, 
perhaps due to the political situation or other reasons. But the definition of love based on 
what Avicenna quoted from some Sufi is the same as the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’s definition of 
love. It is worth noting that this statement does not show that Avicenna was inspired by 
the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā. The only thing that can be claimed is that both Avicenna and the 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā utilized the same source; however, neither Avicenna nor the Ikhwān al- 
Ṣafā revealed the source. 
1.3 Al-Ghazālī On Mysticism  
The life of al-Ghazālī was filled with sweeping change that led him to write on various 
aspects of theology, philosophy, and mysticism. Al-Ghazālī is one of the key scholars 
known for studying Islamic theology as well as mysticism. Two periods of al-Ghazālī’s 
life are important to study in order to understand his thoughts and speculations: the time 
                                                 
43. Ibid., 393. 
ولها اال أن قب لعاشقه نريد ان نوضح فى هذا الفصل أن كل واحد من الموجودات يعشق الخير المطلق عشقا غريزيا و أن الخير المطلق يتجلى
لذي يسميه و المعنى اهمكان و و قبول لتجليه على الحقيقة أعنى على أكمل ما فى االلتجليه و اتصالها به على التفاوت و أن غاية القربى منه ه
 .الصوفية باالتحاد و انه لجوده عاشق أن ينال تجليه و ان وجود األشياء بتجليه
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he spent as a professor at Baghdad University and his period of skepticism. The 
skepticism period plays a crucial role in the life of al-Ghazālī. 
Al-Ghazālī was a well-known professor at the University of Baghdad. When he 
experienced skepticism, he left his position at Baghdad University and abandoned his 
family.44 The answer as to why he left everything behind can be found in his 
autobiography, written a few years before his death. In Deliverer from Error, he openly 
explains his skepticism, describes his spiritual journey, and details his development as a 
thinker. Al-Ghazālī highlights the beginning point of his skepticism: 
I was just a boy since I observed that Christian boys grew up only to be Christian, 
Jewish boys only to be Jewish and Muslim boys only to be Muslim. I also heard 
the Hadith attributed to the prophet of God that states: "every child is born in the 
natural state; his parents make him Jew, Christian, or Magian “I was therefore 
inwardly moved to seek out the reality of this original nature, as well as the reality 
of the beliefs acquired out conformity to parents and teachers.45 
During the period of his skepticism, he no longer found his senses trustworthy. He 
explained how the human senses can be fallible. For example, Al-Ghazālī described the 
shadow that appears static at first glance, but later reveals that it has moved and has been 
moving all the time gradually, imperceptibly. These types of skepticism extended from 
the senses to reason. Here again, al-Ghazālī found no assurance that the primary 
principles of reason can be trusted. Al-Ghazālī’s skepticism was an illness that afflicted 
him for two months.46 His doubt made him lose the ability to speak, and also affected his 
eating and drinking.  
                                                 
44. Henry Corbin, (1993), 180-181. 
45. Al-Ghazālī, (1416 A.H), 538. 
46. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, (2005), 138-139. 
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Al-Ghazālī was searching for certainty to help re-establish his faith and Truth. As he 
wrote in his autobiography: 
I said to myself:" Truth must not lie outside the purview of these four types, for 
they are the ones who follow the paths of Truth-seeking, if Truth eludes them all, 
then I have no hope of apprehending it, for there is no point to reverting to 
conformism once one has left it behind. It is a precondition of being a 
conforming. Once he comes to know that, the glass of conformity is fractured and 
damage is irreparable. It cannot be resembled using the techniques of restoration 
and renovation, but must rather be melted down in the fire and created all over 
again.47 
 Al-Ghazālī, in the path of certainty, turned to theology, but he could no longer find a 
suitable theology, so he left behind this science for people who are interested in theology. 
I began with theology, which I acquired and grasped intellectually by reading the 
works of the reputable authorities among the theologians and by writing some 
works of my own. I found it to be a science that fulfilled its purpose but not mine. 
Thus, theology was not sufficient for my needs and did not provide a cure for my 
disease.48 
After he turns to philosophy, he studies philosophy and writes an influential book, 
Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahâfut al-falâsifa). However, the science of 
philosophy failed to satisfy al-Ghazālī. 
                                                 
47. Al-Ghazālī, (1416 A.H), 541. 
48. Ibid., 541-542. 
23 
 
  
After finishing with theology, I moved on to the science of philosophy. I knew 
refuting the creed before understanding it and becoming acquainted with its 
underlying nature was like taking a shot in the dark.49 
Thenceforth, al-Ghazālī left Baghdad and dedicated his life to the Sufi path, which he 
found to be the remedy for his skepticism. Al-Ghazālī recognized that the impetus behind 
his previous desire to be a professor and writer was worldly achievement. It was not an 
authentic religious impulse. He also alluded to a deeper reason, namely, dissatisfaction 
with the purely doctrinal and rational approaches to religion. These bypassed the essential 
aspect of religious life, the direct experiential, or the (dhawq), taste. He had read the work 
of the Sufis and wanted to follow their practice. This meant seclusion and devotion 
unencumbered by worldly concerns, and thus he decided to leave Baghdad and the 
prestigious teaching position he held. Eleven years away from teaching and his 
dedication to Sufi practices made him a Sufi.50 
When I was done with done with these sciences, I turned my energies to the way 
of mysticism and came to know that their method is brought about by a 
combination of knowledge and practice. The objective of their knowledge is to 
overcome the obstacles found in the soul. they free the soul of blameworthy 
characteristics and malicious attributes in order to clean the heart (the reality of a 
human's spirit where his recognizance of God is located) of everything but God 
Almighty and adorn it with the recollection of God.51 
The motivation for al-Ghazālī to stay mystic is that he was struggling with skepticism. 
The period of skepticism was tough for him because it involved his personal life. When 
al-Ghazālī set out to find certainty, he found the Sufi path to be the best and most secure 
                                                 
49. Ibid., 542. 
50. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, (2005), 139-140. 
51. Al-Ghazālī, (1416 A.H), 553. 
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path. Therefore, he dedicated his life after recovering from skepticism to Islamic 
mysticism.  
 I remained in this state for ten years, and things were revealed to me during my 
solitary retreats that cannot be enumerated or detailed. This much I will mention, 
since it may be a benefit to others: I came to know with certainty that the mystics 
are exclusively the ones who pursue the course that leads to God Almighty. Their 
conduct is the best, their way is the most correct, and their characters are the most 
morally refined. Indeed, if one were to gather the intellect of all rational person, 
the wisdom of sages, and the knowledge of those religious scholars apprised of 
the secrets of religious law, they would be unable to find anything in conduct and 
character of the mystics that could be changed for the better. All their activity, 
whether outward or inward, is obtained from the light of lantern prophecy, in 
comparison with which no light on earth is capable of illuminating.52 
In this period, al-Ghazālī wrote his magnum opus, the Iḥyā, which strove to reconcile 
traditional Muslim belief with Sufism. Also, he wrote one of the mystical Islamic 
masterpieces, The Niche of Light, which is the key-focus of my study of al-Ghazālī’s 
mysticism.53  
Islamic mysticism as a phenomenon was considered by Avicenna and al-Ghazālī later in 
their lives. It led both of them to modify their thoughts and write considerable 
masterpieces on the topic, which are studied as the main works in Islamic mysticism. 
Mysticism was a great mental and physical cure for al-Ghazālī in his period of 
skepticism. Before this pivotal moment in his life, he was a strict lawyer and speculative 
theologian. After, he became a Sufi. Therefore, his motivation for studying mysticism 
appears to be a certainty in which he reconstructs his world-view.   
                                                 
52. Ibid., 554. 
53. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, (2005), 139-140. 
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There are many similarities between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī. However, there is no proof 
in Avicenna’s works or his autobiography that he ever experienced skepticism like al-
Ghazālī did.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
  
Chapter 2 
2 Analyzing Two Philosophical Approaches to Islamic mysticism 
In Chapter 1, I presented the reasons why Avicenna and al-Ghazālī were drawn to 
mysticism. Likewise, I demonstrated that Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s mysticism is 
philosophical mysticism, which correlates with the intellectual foundation of their work. 
Further, I provided evidence to show that Avicenna and the Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ offer the 
same definition of love. Moreover, I alluded to the possibility that both Avicenna and 
Ikhwān al- Ṣafā utilized the same source to define love. At the end of the chapter, I 
highlighted how skepticism was the impetuous behind al-Ghazālī’s transformation to 
mysticism by examining one of his crucial texts: The Deliverance from Error. 
In this chapter, I will assess Remarks and Admonitions and The Niche of Lights to explore 
the differences and similarities between the structure of these books. Considering the 
structure of these books enables the exploration of some key points: the categorization of 
the books within the philosophy-mystical genre; the starting point of philosophical 
Islamic mysticism; and, lastly, the stages of the spiritual journey toward the Truth.  
2.1The Analysis of Remarks and Admonitions 
 Remarks and Admonitions can be divided into two sections: logic and theology. The 
section concerning logic comes first because it provides the necessary foundation for 
understanding Avicenna’s theology. The theology section of the book consists of two 
parts: a philosophical-theological part about the verification of the essence of the Truth 
and the divine names and qualities of the Truth, and a purely philosophical section based 
on the real seeking of the Truth. The second part of Avicenna’s theology illustrates 
Islamic mysticism.  
The mysticism introduced by Avicenna is tantamount to the Prophet Muhammad’s 
utterance, “He who knows himself knows God.” Avicenna describes a spiritual journey 
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that begins from outside the human to the inside, and then inwardly moves towards the 
Truth. Also, the reality with which Avicenna established his mysticism in the Qur’anic 
framework cannot be ignored. In chapter nine and ten of Remarks and Admonitions, 
Avicenna unveils his mystical world-view based on Islamic values and ethical 
framework. 
2.1.1 The Gnostics and the Non- Gnostics  
Regarding chapter nine, Avicenna divides people into two groups: Gnostics (ʿārif), the 
seekers of the Truth, and non-gnostics (ghayr ʿārif). He says that non-gnostics can be 
either pious (ʿābid) or ascetic (zāhid). Avicenna distinguishes between an “ascetic,” one 
who seeks the contentment of this world, the “worshipper,” one who persists in praying 
and fasting, and the “gnostics,” those who seek the perpetual illumination of the light of 
the Truth.54 
Avicenna believes that the intention of the deeds can change the context of deeds. His 
emphasis on intention is equivalent to another Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, 
“Verily, deeds are only with intentions.”55   
To clarify his idea about the intention of deeds, Avicenna compares worshippers with 
gnostics and non-gnostics. He remarks that worship for the non-gnostic is a kind of 
business deal in which someone receives rewards in the afterlife. But for gnostics, 
worship is the gate for approaching the Truth. Also, worship for a gnostic is the 
obedience of the carnal soul (nafs ammārah) to the virtuous soul (nafs mutm’ainnah).56 
Also, asceticism for gnostics is the inward purification of everything but the Truth.57 
                                                 
54. Avicenna, (1375C.E), Chapter9, 143. 
55. Sahih Bukhari, (1388C.E), Volum1, book2, number 51,  
56.“Carnal soul” (nafs ammārah) and “virtuous soul” (nafs mutm’ainnah) are Qur’anic phrases. 
57. Avicenna (1375C.E), Chapter9, 143. 
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The prime and ultimate purpose of gnostics is the Truth (ḥaqq), and the Truth is superior 
to every being. Avicenna claims that people who mediate the Truth for everything but the 
Truth are comparable to children who enjoy childish games and are surprised when older 
people do not enjoy them too. Avicenna thinks that this type of people has never 
experienced real enjoyment; therefore, they satisfy themselves with corporeal joys. Also, 
Avicenna argues that people who only worship God to gain beautiful women and tasty 
wine in the afterlife are people who only think about their appetites and desires in this 
world as well as the next.   
2.1.2 The Stages of the Gnostics  
    After illustrating his understanding of gnostics (ʿārif), Avicenna introduces the stages 
(maqāmāt) of gnostics. According to Avicenna, the first stage is Will (Irāda). Will is an 
accidental property58 that can be acquired by either demonstrative certainty (yaqīn 
burhānī) or faith. Will causes a movement and joy that leads the gnostic to be unified 
with the Truth. 
The first step in the knower’s movement is that which they themselves call 
“willingness” (al-irāda) this is the desire that overcomes the seeker of insight by 
demonstrative certainty or the one whose soul is tranquil due to the conformation 
of faith- to establish a strong relation to the world of sanctity.59 
The crucial point about Avicenna's mysticism is asceticism (zuhd) which is the necessary 
element for the gnostic. Avicenna defines asceticism as an inward practice that results in 
the gnostic abandoning everything but concerns about the Truth. However, asceticism 
                                                 
58. An accidental property of an object is one that it happens to have but could lack. 
59. Avicenna (1375C.E), 145. 
أول درجات حركات العارفين ما يسمونه هم اإلرادة. و هو ما يعتري المستبصر باليقين البرهاني، أو الساكن النفس 
يتحرك سره إلى القدس لينال من روح االتصال. فما دامت درجته هذه إلى العقد اإليماني من الرغبة في اعتالق العروة الوثقى ف
 .فهو مريد
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does not mean having to leave behind material or physical life in Avicenna’s 
framework.60 
Avicenna remarks that the gnostic requires austerity (rīāẓat)61 for three purposes or goals, 
and each goal can be achieved through certain actions. The first goal is to condemn the 
non-Truth by altruism (īthār) and freedom. What really supports the first aim is real 
austerity. The second goal is the obedience of the carnal soul to the virtuous soul by the 
faculty of imagination and fancy guiding it towards the divine Kingdom. Worship along 
with thinking and awareness can assist the second goal. The third goal is the inward 
purification of awareness. Pure love is not based on lust and appetite, and pure thoughts 
assist the third goal.62 
The result of devotion is the enjoyment of observing the Truth. This kind of enjoyment is 
comparable with the short period of shining light for the gnostic that Avicenna calls 
“moment” (waqt). According to Avicenna, every moment is between two joys, the joy 
before and after a moment. Avicenna explains that the gnostic would lose peace when 
connecting to the Truth, and when this happens, others realize his restlessness. However, 
if the gnostic thinks about his real self deeply, he can connect to the Truth without 
drawing the attention.63 
Asceticism with self-contemplation (tʿaaqqul dhātī) plays a crucial role in Avicenna’s 
mysticism. Avicenna believes austerity can help the gnostic to gain real peace and to 
transform his temporary moment (waqt guzarā) into a permanent moment (waqt dāʾm). 
                                                 
60. Avicenna was strict in his mysticism. He believed that even our imagination should not be 
preoccupied with the non-Truth. 
61. Gnosis should try to focus on the Truth, which is an internal action. 
62. Avicenna (1375C.E), 145. 
63. Ibid., 146. 
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To be in a permanent moment means being with the Truth in every moment; if the 
gnostic disconnects from the Truth he would be restless and suffer.64 
One of Avicenna’s interesting points is the journey that starts from self-centering to 
Truth-centering. In other words, when gnostics are in the higher stages of spiritual 
journey, they cannot see themselves as an independent existence. As the mystical path is 
the way that the seeker should follow, he must turn away from everything except the 
Truth, even himself. Even if he considers himself as observing the Truth, in this stage, the 
gnostic is a tool for observing the Truth.65 
Overall, the goal of Avicenna’s mysticism is not the enjoyment of mysticism; rather, the 
goal is the Truth. Mysticism is a path for experiencing the Truth and achieving union 
with the Truth. If the gnostic is too occupied with the enjoyment of experiencing the 
Truth, he cannot experience the reality of connecting to the Truth. 
2.1.3 The Attributes of the Gnostics  
Avicenna considers some attributes of a gnostic, with the first being that a gnostic should 
be happy because they observe the Truth in very moment.   
The knower is bright-faced, friendly, and smiling. Due to this modesty, he honors 
the young as he honors the old. He is as pleased with the unclear headed as he is 
with the alert. How could he not be bright-faced when he enjoys the Truth and 
everything other than the Truth, for how could he not treat all as equal when to 
him, all are equal, they are the object of mercy, preoccupied with falsehoods. 66 
                                                 
64. Ibid., 146. 
65. Ibid., 147. 
66. Ibid., 146. 
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Another attribute of the gnostic is courage; he is not scared of the death. The gnostics see 
death as another gate for union with the Truth.67 
The knower is courageous. How could he be otherwise, when he is in isolation 
from the fear of the death?  He is generous. How could he be otherwise, when he 
is in the isolation from the love of falsehood? He is forgiving of others. How 
could he be otherwise, when his soul is more magnanimous than to be injured 
with evil by another? finally, he is forgetful of grudges how he could be otherwise 
when his memory is preoccupied with the truth.68 
Scrutinizing the states of others is not one of the attributes of the gnostic because the 
gnostic is always engaged in self-contemplation, which makes him occupied with 
himself. Therefore, the business of other people does not concern the gnostics.69 
The knower is not concerned with scrutinizing the state of others, nor with 
gathering the information about others, nor is inclined to anger at observing bad 
deeds, as he is filled with mercy. This is because he discerns God’s secret 
regarding destiny. If he requests good deeds so with kindness characterized by 
advice and not with violence characterized by pointing out disgrace. If he 
magnifies the value of good deeds, it could be because he wishes to protect such 
deeds from those who don’t adopt them.70 
Avicenna claims that the gnostic ignores the path through which he acquires the Truth 
because he does not need anything more than the Truth. Therefore, all the gnostic thinks 
about is the Truth. As there are no religious duties for people who only focus on the 
Truth, the gnostics do not have any religious duties (taklīf). It important to clarify that 
                                                 
67. Ibid., 147. 
68. Ibid., 90. 
69. Ibid., 148. 
70. Ibid., 148. 
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people who perform religious duties like praying and fasting are broken into two groups: 
people who think about duties or those who do something by mistake, sinners. However, 
the gnostic does not make any mistakes because every mistake limits his enjoyment of 
connecting with the Truth. Also, the gnostic does not think about duties because thinking 
about duties means preoccupation with non-Truth.71 Avicenna’s mysticism may have 
started from Islam, but it goes beyond all religions, including Islam, because of his 
philosophical discipline.  
Avicenna summarizes mysticism’s three goals. First, the separation (tafrīq) of the gnostic 
and whatever makes him busy. Second, the abandonment (tark) of everything, even one’s 
self as an independent existence. Third, the rejection (rafḍ) of everything but the Truth. 
The mysticism beings by truly adept's separation (tafrīq), detachment, 
abandonment (tark), and rejection(rafḍ) —concentrating on a togetherness that is 
the togetherness of the attributes of the Truth, reaching one and then stopping. 72 
2.1.4 The Connection with the Divine Kingdom73 
Chapter ten of Remarks and Admonitions is dedicated to the quality of the revelation that 
the gnostic would receive from the Divine Kingdom. Also, Avicenna addresses 
supernatural acts that only the gnostic perform. 
Avicenna says the gnostic is capable of refusing food for a long time and that this kind of 
refusal is not supernatural. Then, Avicenna explains how the gnostic can refuse food 
based on nature. 
                                                 
71.Ibid., 148-149. 
72. Ibid., 147. 
73. The Divine Kingdom, or the hidden world, is the world of things ordinarily not seen or 
understood by humans, such as future events. 
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Remember that if our natural powers are distracted by digestion of bad materials 
from processing the good materials, the latter will be preserved with slight 
dissolution and with no need for substitution. He who enjoys the retention of the 
good materials may afford being deprived of nourishment for a long time. If one 
in a different state is deprived in a similar way—rather, for one-tenth of the time 
of his deprivation, one would perish. On the contrary, in spite of this, the life of 
the one retaining the good materials is preserved.74 
In addition, Avicenna explains the philosophical reason for refusing food from the 
gnostic’s perspective. 
If the tranquil soul tames the bodily powers, these powers are pulled behind the 
soul along with their preoccupations toward which these powers turn, whether or 
not there is a need for these preoccupations in the management of the body. If 
pulling of these powers toward the divine realm is intensified, as is their being 
distracted from the direction that they had abandoned. Thus, the natural acts that 
are attributed to the power of the vegetative soul, stop, and the only dissolution of 
good, materials that occur is less than that which occurs in the states of illness. 
…the knower has a nature that is distracted from matter, with the addition of two 
more advantages: the lack of dissolution resulting from something like the hot, 
bad mixture, and the lack of illness that opposes these powers. Furthermore, the 
knower has a third assistant. That is bodily rest from the movements of the 
body—a rest that is the best assistant. Therefore, it is more appropriate for the 
knower’s bodily power to preserved than for those of ill. What is related to you 
concerning this is not in opposition to the teaching of nature.75 
                                                 
74. Avicenna (1375C.E), 149. 
75. Ibid., 149-150. 
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As mentioned above, the gnostic is able to perform supernatural acts, such as being aware 
of the future.  According to Avicenna, being aware of the future is not impossible, and he 
proved that it is possible through philosophical and experimental argument. The 
philosophical proof confirms that it is possible to access the divine realm of awareness 
because people have access to the divine realm in their sleep. Also, experiences confirm 
that there are some people who could predict the future.  
Avicenna believes that knowing the future requires particular conditions, suggesting that 
everybody cannot have access to the divine realm. Before he provides the necessary 
conditions for knowing the future, he explains a related premise. 
The particular things are imprinted in the intellectual world under a universal 
aspect. After that, it was pointed out to you that celestial bodies have souls that 
possess the particular knowledge and particular wills produced by a particular 
opinion. There is nothing that prevents this soul from conceiving the particular 
concomitants of particular movements of these bodies—these concomitants are 
expressed by beings these bodies produce in the world of elements. Furthermore, 
if what is revealed by kind of consideration is concealed except from those who 
are well grounded in the exalted wisdom—namely, that the celestial bodies have 
after the separate intellects that belongs to them as principle, rational souls that 
are not imprinted in their matters but possess a certain relation to their matters (as 
do our souls with regard to our bodies), and that by virtue of this relation, the 
celestial bodies will have an additional significance in this. They manifest a 
particular opinion and another universal one. 76 
Avicenna emphasizes that accessing the future for the gnostic requires removing 
hindrances (mawāi)ʾ77 and having an innate disposition (istʿidād) to such abilities. 
                                                 
76. Ibid., 150-153. 
77. Everything that distracts humans from the Truth. 
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Avicenna then divides the faculties of people into two categories: internal and external. 
The external faculties are the senses of sight, smell, taste, touch, and hearing. The internal 
faculties include anger, attraction, desire, digestion, disposal, estimation, reproduction, 
evacuation and the appetitive faculty. Avicenna claims that as much as the human soul 
can gain strength by altruism, its influence diminishes due to these internal and external 
faculties.78 
Avicenna illustrates the way that the gnostic can connect to the divine realm by avoiding 
the external and internal preoccupations.  
 Once, sensory preoccupations are reduced and fewer preoccupations remain, it is 
not unlikely for the soul to have escapes that lead from the work of the 
imagination to the side of sanctity. Thus, representation of the invisible world is 
imprinted in the soul, which then flow to the world of imagination and are then 
imprinted in common sense. This happens either in the state of sleep, which 
preoccupies the external senses or in the state of a certain disease, which weakens 
the imagination.79 
Avicenna highlights the strength of the soul; he believes that the substance of the soul's 
essence can connect to the divine realm in a mode of awareness. Also, the faculty of 
imagination can imprint forms from the divine realm onto the soul.  
Furthermore, the faculty of imagination facilitates access to the Divine Kingdom for both 
gnostics and prophets. Therefore, according to Avicenna, revelation and inspiration 
require interpretation because the human must transform forms from the Divine Kingdom 
into language through the assistance of the imagination.  
                                                 
78. Avicenna (1375C.E), 154-155. 
79.Ibid., 154. 
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The imaginative power is constituted such that it imitates any neighboring intellective or 
temperamental disposition and moves quickly from one thing to its like or to the 
opposite—in brief, to whatever is due to that thing by virtue of a cause. Undoubtedly, 
there is particular cause of the individuation of that thing, even though we ourselves do 
not realize them concretely. Were this power not so constituted, we would not have what 
assists us in the movement of thought that seeks a conclusion by grasping the middle 
terms and what resembles them in some manner, in the recalling of things forgotten, and 
in other benefits.80 
  2.2 Analysis of The Niche of Lights  
Al-Ghazālī divided The Niche of Lights into three chapters. In the first chapter, which 
concerns the light, he tries to unveil the meaning of the light. Also, he claims that the use 
of the name “light” for both material light (e.g., sun, lamp) and intellectual light (e.g., 
light of understanding) is sheer metaphor without any reality. Chapter two is dedicated to 
a controversial verse in the Qur’an, the Nūr verse:  
Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The example of His light is like a 
niche within which is a lamp, the lamp is within glass, the glass as if it were a 
pearly [white] star lit from [the oil of] a blessed olive tree, neither of the east nor 
of the west, whose oil would almost glow even if untouched by fire. Light upon 
light. Allah guides to His light whom He wills. And Allah presents examples for 
the people, and Allah is Knowing of all things.81  
This verse has been examined by many Muslim philosophers. Many of them, including 
al-Ghazālī, have attempted to clarify the meaning and significance of this verse because 
they consider it to be extremely metaphorical and symbolic. The second chapter of this 
                                                 
80. Ibid., 156-157. 
81. Qur’an, 24:35. 
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book is divided into two parts: the first examines the mystery and method of using 
similitudes and the second clarifies the level of luminous human spirit, both of which 
help one come to know the similitudes of the Qur’an. In the last chapter, al-Ghazālī 
connects the Nūr verse and the following utterance by the prophet: “God has seventy 
veils of lights and darkness.” 
In the first chapter of The Niche of Lights, Al-Ghazālī explains the keywords of his main 
concepts, such as light, illumination, and soul. He then relies on the Qur’anic verse Nūr 
for explaining his world-view. 
In general, The Niche of Lights is the story of the existence of universe from its origin and 
the role of the Truth. Al-Ghazālī discusses two journeys that are famous in Islamic 
philosophy: A journey started by the creator for creatures and a journey made by humans 
to the creator.  
2.2.1 The Common, the Elect, the Elect of Elect 
 Chapter one begins by classifying people into three categories:  the common people, the 
elect people, and the elect of the elect people. These categories are crucial in Al-
Ghazālī’s work because they form the basis of his definition of light, as the meaning of 
light is different for each category of people. 
For the common people, the meaning of light alludes to manifestation, which is relative 
in the sense that a thing may be manifest to one person while remaining non-manifest for 
another.82 To explain this concept, Al-Ghazālī defines the eye in two different ways: the 
material eye, or the eye we use to observe the world of sensation, and the immaterial eye, 
or the eye that is embodied in the human heart and completely free of imperfections. The 
immaterial eye is also called the rational faculty. The rational faculty has inward and 
outward spies working for it, making the rational faculty aware of the world. The five 
                                                 
82. Al-Ghazālī, (1998) 3-4. 
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senses are the outward spies, whereas the inward spies are imagination, fancy, reflection, 
recollection and memory. After comparing and contrasting the limitations of both, Al-
Ghazālī concludes that the second eye, or the rational faculty, is supreme. According to 
Al-Ghazālī, this eye is the light used to compare things, and also darkness results if this 
eye is not utilized.83 Al-Ghazālī believes that if humans never start their journey towards 
the heavenly realm, they will stay at the level of materialism. Specifically, he asserts that 
humans should be free from the sensation faculties and instead rely on their imagination 
for entering the heavenly realm. For the people who accomplish this—namely the 
prophets—the door of knowledge will be open; they will have access to the heavenly and 
invisible world. The visible and sensible world is simply a shadow of this heavenly 
world. Thus, the real light for the Sufi is the Light of Lights, the Truth, while for common 
people the real light is, for example, the sun or a lamp.  
Overall, light, is defined by Al-Ghazālī as that which sees itself and others. Therefore, if 
an independent thing can be seen and also allows for other things to be seen, then it is 
worthy of the name “light” and can be named a “light-giving lamp.” Al-Ghazālī further 
divided light into two categories: heavenly light and earthly light, with each type having 
its own hierarchy. However, it is important that the hierarchy of these lights is not endless 
because an endless hierarchy is impossible. Therefore, the lights must all go back to an 
independent light that does not have any cause, and all lights are illuminated by this light. 
This light is called the Light of Lights.84 
In Al-Ghazālī’s paradigm, all lights, heavenly and earthly, are not real lights; rather, they 
are metaphorical lights because they do not have an independent existence without the 
Light of Lights. Therefore, alone, the lights are darkness and can only be illuminated and 
shining when they are connected to their source. Prophets and saints who have studied 
                                                 
83. Ibid., 5-6. 
84. Ibid., 12-14. 
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the source of lights have seen a unity of lights. They believe that given this unity, there is 
no room for anything else except the Truth, which is the Light of Lights. At the highest 
level of lights, there are rational lights that fill both the higher and lower worlds. The 
rational lights are the substance of the angels. 
The order of the lights forms a hierarchy, with the Light of Lights being the cause of all 
the lights, and each light below a relative cause for the lights that fall below in the 
hierarchy. The low human light causes the world of sensation, and the heavenly world is 
caused by angelic light. In sum, based on this dualistic—outward, or material and inward, 
or immaterial—world, there are two types of light for humans: the visible light and the 
non-manifested light.85  
There are two ways to declare God’s unity according to al-Ghazālī. The first translates to 
“There is no gods but God,” and it is for common people who are stuck in the material 
world. The second is for the elect people, and can be translated as, “There is no god but 
He.” This second definition of oneness belongs to the prophets and saints. In relation to 
this idea of oneness, al-Ghazālī explains that the most important concept of Islamic 
mysticism is annihilation, (fanāʾ). Annihilation, for al-Ghazālī, is not physical death for 
the sake of God but rather unity with God.86 
From al-Ghazālī’s perspective the Qur’anic equivalent of common people, the elect 
people, and the elect of elect people are heedless and veiled (ghāfilūn), firmly rooted in 
knowledge (rāsikhūn) and righteous (ṣiddīqīn), respectively.87 
2.2.2 The Dualistic Cosmos: One world, Two Perspectives  
                                                 
85.Ibid., 15. 
86. Ibid., 20. 
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According to Al-Ghazālī, the cosmos consists of two worlds: the bodily, sensory, low 
world and the spiritual, rational, high world. These names for the different worlds vary 
according to perspective. For example, when these two worlds are viewed individually, 
they are called the bodily world and the spiritual world, respectively. These dual worlds 
can also be referred to as the unseen world and the dominion world (ʿālam malakūt). This 
kind of classification can be confusing for people who get mired in the visible and 
sensory world; they may think that these different terms to signify the world might 
indicate different realities, but there is only a single, unified reality.88 
Al-Ghazālī claims that the sensory world functions as a ladder to climb to reach the 
spiritual world. Therefore, he does not deny the importance of the sensory and bodily 
world for spiritual development; he considers the bodily world a necessary step. 
Nevertheless, the sensory world is different from the spiritual world even though there is 
a relationship between them. It is important to note that al-Ghazālī has never denied any 
aspect of human life, but he asserts that some aspects are supreme to others. For example, 
the spiritual, intellectual aspect of humankind is supreme to the physical.89 
The spiritual, rational, high world of holiness (ʿālam quds) is beyond both the sensory 
world and the world of imagination and fancy (wahm). Therefore, the prophets and saints 
ripped the veil from the sensory and imaginary world; they progressed from the lowest 
world to the highest world when witnessing the unseen and spiritual world. The only gate 
between the spiritual and bodily worlds is the human soul because the soul has attributes 
of both the spiritual and bodily worlds. The aim of The Niche of Lights is therefore to 
show that the human soul is the way to connect with the Light of Lights. This path (ṣirāț 
al-mustaqīm)90 is said to be in the Qur’an, at least from the Sufi’s perspective, the 
journey from the bodily, sensory, low world towards the spiritual, rational, high world by 
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means of the human soul. For al-Ghazālī, angels are noble and high luminescent 
substances in the holy world. Angels illuminate the human soul, and they also provide 
different levels of light. 
 Then, al-Ghazālī illustrates the human ascent from the sensory world to the holy, 
spiritual, intellectual world. There are several steps in this process: first, one must leave 
his or her body. What exactly enables humans to stay on this path is ethics,  morality, and 
Islamic law( sharīʾah).91 
Entering the holy world requires a journey via both the bodily and spiritual worlds. The 
knowledge of God is sent from the holy world and received in the world below by some 
receptive substances (jawāhir qābilih) which then transfer this knowledge to other 
receptive substances in the lower levels. But what is really important in receiving wisdom 
(ḥikmah) is the potential of the substance, as the Light of Lights illuminates this 
knowledge to all. Next, al-Ghazālī clarifies the symbolic meaning of “pen,”92 “the 
preserved tablet,93” and “the unrolled parchment.”94 In The Niche of Lights, Al-Ghazālī 
divides the cosmos into two parts: the seen and unseen world. He also elucidates that the 
human being is a small cosmos—everything that exists in the big cosmos exists in the 
human too.95 
To explain this idea further, there are two cosmoses for Al-Ghazālī: cosmos (al- ‘alam 
akbar) and human (al- ‘alam asghar). Though they are different from each other, there is 
an analogy and connection between them. People who are eager to be on the path of the 
Truth should start from within themselves, which is parallel with the cosmos. For 
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92. Qur’an, 68:1. 
93. Qur’an, 85:21. 
94. Qur’an, 52:3. 
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example, a gnosis who wants to experience the Light of Lights should start from within 
himself by paying less attention to his senses, ignoring material things in the sensory 
world. 
The imaginary faculty has a crucial role in the path of the Truth, as the imaginary faculty 
has two key aspects: if it becomes blurred, it cannot reflect the knowledge from the 
spiritual world, and once it is purified from the senses and fancy, it can be seen as a 
mirror that reflects the image of the spiritual world.   
2.2.3 Unveiling the Key Words in Nūr Verse 
Al-Ghazālī classifies the human spirit (rūḥ) into five layers: the sensible spirit (rūḥ 
ḥasās), imaginal spirit (rūḥ khīyālī), rational spirit (rūḥ ʿaqlī), reflective spirit (rūḥ fikrī), 
and the holy prophetic spirit (rūḥ quds nabawī). The sensible spirit belongs to the five 
senses, and it is like a gate to the outward world. The role of the sensible spirit is to 
transfer whatever it receives from the outward world to the imaginal spirit, which 
preserves that data and then transfers it to the rational spirit. The rational spirit belongs to 
the human being and makes humans capable of understanding meaning beyond senses 
and imagination. The reflective spirit is the receiver of abstract, rational knowledge, 
whereas the holy prophetic spirit is particular to prophets and apostles (rusūl). Al-Ghazālī 
also argues that there is a level beyond the rational which the saints are incapable of 
reaching. These spirits are lights because sensory and imaginal beings would be 
observable as a result of these spirits.  There are three categories for knowledge: faith, 
accepting via imitation; knowledge, drawing the analogy; and taste, discovering the 
Truth.96  
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Al-Ghazālī’s aim is to harmonize the Qur’an, God’s words, and the prophet’s words: the 
hadith “God has seventy veils of light and darkness; were He to lift them, the august 
glories of His face would burn up everyone whose eyesight perceived Him.”  
The Light of Lights, undoubtedly, discloses himself to his essence in his essence. There is 
no veil or border that hides the Light of Lights from him. The veils that hide the Light of 
Lights hidden his creatures are caused by his creatures. These veils can be light, darkness 
or light along with darkness. Al-Ghazālī divides veils into three categories that cover 
human’s eyes from the illumination of the Light of Lights. 
2.2.4 Veiled by Darkness 
People who are veiled by sheer darkness fall into two groups. Firstly, people who do not 
believe in God and the last day. Secondly, people who put all their power and focus into 
material successes. The second group can be further divided into two categories: people 
who look for the cause of the world and people who are busy with their senses. Al-
Ghazālī asserts that these veils are sheer darkness for both groups because both looking 
for the cause or sinking into the seen world are tied to the world of sensation, and the 
world of sensation is sheer darkness because it is the shadow of the unseen world.  
For those who think that the ultimate goal of this life is to satisfy their appetite and desire, 
their veil is their impure soul. For those with an ultimate goal of domination and taking 
control over other people by killing, capturing, and generally showing their power, their 
veil is predatory attributes. They are most content with an abundance of ownership. The 
last group, those veiled by their imagination, pretends to possess a rational faculty, and 
their ultimate goal in life is fame and honor.97 
2.2.5 The Light Veil Along with Darkness  
                                                 
97. Ibid., 45-47.  
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The origin of the light veiled with darkness is the senses, imagination and corrupt rational 
comparison. The first group is people who pray for their idols; they are not looking for 
the knowledge of God. Also, people who pray for idols are in three groups. The first 
group is comprised of people who consider God mightier than everything else, but their 
sense is their darkness; therefore, they make gods out of precious substances like gold 
and silver and pray for them.  
The second group is divided into two classes. First, the light veiled along with the 
darkness of sense, are people who do not have any official religion or creed, but they are 
enchanted with the beauty of their lord because their lord is the most beautiful. They love 
the beauty of nature and humans; in other words, they believe in naturalism. The second 
class, the light veiled along with the darkness of imagination, understands that there is 
something beyond the senses, but they cannot go further than their imaginative faculty. 
Al-Ghazālī classifies many of the Islamic theological schools in this category. The lowest 
level of people who cannot go further than the imagination is called Karram’iyyah.98 This 
class believes that God has sovereign attributes, but they make a comparison between 
themselves and God. For example, they see human’s power so they come to the 
conclusion that God has power too but in the highest level. All are veiled to the light 
along with darkness because of corrupted rational comparison.99 
The third group consists of people who believe that their God is luminous in his own 
essence. Their God is the sensible and visible light. Some of them pray to fire while 
others pray to the stars, moon and sun. Also, there are some people who see light and 
darkness but believe that the light is sovereign. These people believe in dualism. The 
third group, veiled by sheer light, is divided into three classes. The first class believes that 
God does not have the same attributes as human beings, so they deny that it is possible to 
                                                 
98. One of the Islamic theological schools that believed in the corporeality of God. Also, faith in 
God can be confirmed by tongue. Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. 2014. 
99. Al-Ghazālī, (1998), 47-49.  
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know God via his attributes. Instead, they come to know him in his relation to his 
creatures. The second class contends that God is the first mover and mover of everything. 
The last class goes further than the previous classes, turning their attention away from 
God as the mover of heaven and the celestial bodies and towards God as the origin of 
heaven and the celestial bodies. Also, this last group is divided into two levels. The first 
level is comprised of those who are burned up, effaced and annihilated. However, by 
observing the beauty, might, and holiness, they remain an observer of their own essence 
in the beauty. In other words, annihilation and losing all identity as a human being is 
missing. These people fake the loss of their identity; the identity of their self remains. 
The level is made up of people who do not have any identity except the image of God, 
and for them everything is dead except his face. They do not have any self-identity; they 
only have God’s image. In other words, they are annihilated and al-Ghazālī calls these 
people the elect of the elect.100 
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Chapter 3 
3 The Comparison of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s Mysticism Keywords 
The aim of this chapter, after clarifying Avicenna’s and al-Ghazālī’s mystical viewpoints, 
is to explore similarities and differences in their use of Islamic Mysticism. It is clear that 
the main focus of Islamic mysticism is the definition of the Truth (ḥaqq). According to 
what has been said in the previous chapters, mysticism is a path that begins from the 
human and moves toward the Truth. Therefore, many Muslim thinkers attempt to clarify 
mysticism and its goal. From the Islamic mystical perspective, the aim of mysticism is 
the union of true seekers and the Truth. Thus, at the core of Islamic theology, philosophy 
and mysticism is the quest for the Truth. 
Avicenna and al-Ghazālī have different approaches to Islamic mysticism due to their 
dissimilar philosophical structures. However, their different viewpoints do not mean that 
they neglect the overall common goal of Islamic mysticism: union with the Truth. 
Interestingly, though, Avicenna and al-Ghazālī offer different definitions of the Truth. 
It is worth noting that the Truth for all Muslim thinkers is fundamentally the same, but 
they utilize different language for expressing it. Rumi, for example, expresses the Truth 
through poetic language, while Avicenna express mysticism through the language of 
philosophy. Using different languages to define the Truth, though, does not mean that the 
reality of the Truth is different. 
3.1 The Absolute Truth 
In chapter four of Remarks and Admonitions, Avicenna defines the Truth in philosophical 
terms, but it seems that the definition of the Truth from both a philosophical and mystical 
perspective is the same for him. 
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Avicenna believes in the absolute being (wujūd muțlaq), which does not need a definition 
because the absolute being is recognized by reason itself (ʿaql).101 There are two 
classifications of the absolute being: the necessary being and the contingent being 
According to these categories, Avicenna proves, philosophically, the existence of the 
necessary being as the philosophical Truth. 
The being of that entity which being, is either necessary (wājib) in itself due to its 
own nature, or it is not necessary. The being of that which is not necessary in 
itself is either an impossible (mumtaniʾ) or a contingency (mumkin). Whatever is 
impossible in itself can never be realized (mujūd). Consequently, it must be 
contingent due to itself and necessary due to the condition (shart) that its cause 
exist, whereas it is an impossibility due to the condition that its cause does not 
exist. One factor is its being and another distinct factor is the condition of the 
existence or non- existence of a cause. When one considers its being-qua-being 
without any other condition, it is neither necessary nor an impossibility. when one 
considers that determined cause, which is the condition for realizing its cause, it 
becomes necessary, whereas it becomes an impossibility of one considers as its 
cause. the condition of the non-realization of its cause. Hence, if one considers 
number without regard to any conditions which are usually associated with it, its 
nature cannot be an impossibility for as such it would never exist. but if one 
regards the state of the number four which result from two times tow, the result 
must be necessary, for its non-realization as four is an impossibility. Hence, any 
existing entity, for which existence is not intrinsically necessary (wujūdī wājib) is 
contingent in itself. Since becoming an existent is contingency, and since a 
contingency in itself is never realized because it has not come from a cause, it is 
necessary, therefore, that the contingency be realized by means of a cause.102 
                                                 
101. Ehsan Yar-Shater, (1973), 15. 
102. Ibid., 48. 
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 Philosophically, Avicenna tries to clarify the role and the definition of the necessary 
being. Also, Avicenna remarks that the necessary being does not have any relation with 
any cause due to its necessary nature. 
 In itself, necessary Existent cannot be united with any cause. since it being is 
necessary in itself without being caused. It’s being cannot be due to a cause. thus 
it is not united with any cause. if it’s being were not necessary without a cause, it 
would not be Necessary Existent in itself. 103 
Form a mystical viewpoint, the Truth for Avicenna is the absolute being (wujūdi muțlaq), 
which is clear and therefore does not need to be defined. 
Being is recognized by reason itself without the aid of definition (ḥadd) or 
description (rasm). Since it has no definition, it has either no genus (jins) no 
differentiation (faṣl) because nothing is more clear than it. Being does not have a 
description because nothing is better known than it.104 
Consequently, the Truth for Avicenna can be philosophical Truth (the necessary being), 
or mystical Truth (the absolute being). For Avicenna, both the philosophical and mystical 
descriptions of the Truth do not require a distinct definition because of their clearness. 
Also, the reality of the absolute being and the necessary being is same for Avicenna; 
however, he uses two different words to define the same reality.  
Unlike Avicenna, al-Ghazālī’s mystical definition of the Truth is within the Islamic 
context, the Qur’an and Hadith. When al-Ghazālī defines the Truth, he utilizes the 
Qur’anic word Light (nūr) in a metaphorical way for his definition, ”the real light is 
                                                 
103. Ibid., 49. 
104. Ibid., 15. 
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Allah and that the name light for everything else is sheer metaphor, without reality.”105 
Al-Ghazālī draws on the Qur’an and Hadith to describe his meaning of the Truth. 
We say:  that which sees itself and others is more worthy of the name” light.” So 
if it be something that also allows other thing to see while seeing itself and others, 
then it is even more worthy of the name of light than that which has no effect at 
all on others. Or rather, it is more appropriate that it should be called a “light-
giving-lamp,” since it pours forth its light upon other things. 106 
Since “light” can be used in different contexts with different meanings, al-Ghazālī offers 
a classification of it to make his own definition clear. Thus, al-Ghazālī wants to illustrate 
a comprehensive picture of the light for seekers of the Truth. According to al-Ghazālī, the 
first classification of the light is sensible light, which is divided into three stages.  
Regarding the first sense of the word, “light” alludes to manifestation. 
Manifestation is relative affair (amr iẓāfī). In relationship to visual sensation, 
things are of three kinds: first those which cannot be seen themselves, such as 
dark bodies.  Second, those which can be seen in themselves but by which other 
things cannot be seen, such as bright bodies or starts that are not aflame. Third are 
those which can be seen in themselves and by which other things can be seen, 
such as sun, the moon, a lamp, and a flaming fire.” Light” is a name that belong to 
third kind.107 
The goal of al-Ghazālī is to prove the real and absolute light in the whole universe: “the 
Light of Lights.” Therefore, he explains the different kinds of light and their attributes, 
conceptualizing them as metaphoric lights representing the sheer light “Allah”. 
                                                 
105. Al-Ghazālī, (1998), 3. 
106. Ibid., 12-13. 
107. Ibid., 4. 
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The clarification of the meaning of the intellectual light makes it distinct from the 
sensible light. Al-Ghazali explains the attributes of the intellectual light, which make it a 
supreme existent upon the sensible light, the light of the seeing eye.108 Then, al-Ghazālī 
remarks that if the intellectual light is not veiled by fancy and imagination, it  offers an 
accurate view of the real nature of beings.  
The rational faculty is more worthy to be named “light” than outward eye.  
Because its measure is lifted beyond the imperfection. As for rational faculty, 
once it disengages itself from the covering of fancy and imagination, it is 
inconceivable that can commit an error. On the contrary, it will see things as they 
are in themselves109. 
As demonstrated in the above discussion, light plays an important role in al-Ghazālī’s 
mysticism. Al-Ghazālī’s mysticism is shaped by the hierarchy of lights. The hierarchy of 
lights commences with the Light of Lights, followed by the intellectual light, and ending 
with the sensible light. The Light of Lights occupies the highest place in the universe. 
Also, the Light of Lights bestows on other beings its illumination.  
Since you have recognized that lights have a hierarchy, know also that this 
hierarchy does not continue on to infinity. Rather, it climbs to the first source, 
which is light in itself and by itself and to which no light comes from any other. 
From this light all the lights shine forth, according to the hierarchy. Consider now 
if the name “light” is more appropriate and worthy for that which is illuminated 
and borrows its light from another, or for that which is luminous in itself and 
which bestows light upon everything else. It seems to me that the Truth of this is 
not hidden from you. Thus, it is verified that the name “light” is more appropriate 
                                                 
108. Ibid., 6. 
109. Ibid., 6-9. 
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for the furthest, highest light, beyond which there is no lights and from which 
light descends to others. 110 
It is worth noting that al-Ghazālī begins by remarking on the similarity between the 
meaning of Truth and the light. Then, he describes the attributes of this pure light, which 
is based on the Islamic monotheistic creed, “There is no gods but God.” 
So the real light is he in whose hand is “the creation and the command” and from 
whom illumination comes in the first place and by whom it is preserved in the 
second place. No one is a partner with him in the reality of this name, nor in being 
worthy for it, unless he should name him by it and show him kindness by naming 
him so, like a master who shows kindness to his slave by giving him property and 
then calling him a master. When the reality is unveiled to the slave, he knows that 
he himself and his property belong only to his mater, who, of course, has no 
partner whatsoever in any this.111 
The common point between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī regarding the definition of the 
Truth is that both of them believe that the Truth is clear and does not need a definition. 
Furthermore, both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī highlight the analogical gradation of the 
Truth, indicating that the Truth contains stages. Avicenna, for example, divides the 
absolute being into the necessary and the contingent being. Similarly, al-Ghazālī 
categorizes light into the sensible light, the intellectual or rational light, and the Light of 
Lights. 
To be precise, the meaning of the Truth for Avicenna and al-Ghazālī has many 
similarities. At first glance, it seems that Avicenna becomes mired in philosophy, 
whereas al-Ghazālī is supported by religion. However, there are some points that make 
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Avicenna and al-Ghazālī the same in their definition of the Truth. First, the notion of 
light for al-Ghazālī is tantamount to the notion of being for Avicenna, as both contend 
that there is no need for any definition of “the light” and “being”. Also, they both remark 
that “the light” and “being” do not need to be defined because they are clear.  
The second point that Avicenna and al-Ghazālī have in common on the subject of the 
Truth is their division of “the light” and “being”. For Avicenna, the necessary being is 
equivalent to the Light of Lights in al-Ghazālī’s paradigm because both occupy the first 
place in the hierarchy of the cosmos. Also, the Light of Lights bestows light to others just 
as the necessary being gives existence to everything. Despite these similarities, however, 
there is a difference between the object of the Light of Lights and the necessary being. 
The necessary being, for Avicenna, has a philosophical context; Avicenna names the 
necessary being the First Cause. In contrast, al-Ghazālī compares the Light of Lights with 
Allah, the God of Islam.  
Furthermore, the intellectual light and the sensible light are tantamount to contingent 
being because they do not have any independent light without the Light of Lights. The 
contingent being is nothing without the First Cause. 
Another common point between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī is the subject of illumination 
(ishrāq). According to Avicenna’s philosophy, the highest place in the hierarchy of 
existence is occupied by the absolute being. Beings come into existence by the emanation 
of the absolute being. The absolute being in Avicenna’s system is the life giver, form 
giver, and the giver of existence.  
The Light of Lights awards the light, which means existence, to other lights. Also, there 
would not be any kind of light without the emanation from the Light of Lights. 
Additionally, the name “light” for intellectual light and sensible light is pure metaphor 
because the real light is the Light of Lights.   
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This investigation into Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s definitions of the Truth reveals that 
they suggest a similar meaning but utilize different terminology. What can be said about 
the terminology of Avicenna is that he is a philosopher who speaks philosophically and 
attempts to keep a philosophical framework in his mysticism. On the other hand, al-
Ghazālī utilizes the Qur’anic context for the definition of the Truth. 
3.2 Dualistic Universe  
According to the previous sections, the goal of Islamic mysticism is the union of human 
beings with the Truth. Furthermore, the meaning of the Truth has been clarified from 
Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s viewpoints. This section will explore the path that the seeker 
should take to find the Truth and the division of the world according to Avicenna and al-
Ghazālī. 
It is important to note that Avicenna does not offer a clear division of the world in 
chapter ten and nine of Remarks and Admonitions. However, his division of the world 
can be found in other parts of Remarks and Admonitions indirectly. Avicenna divides 
happiness into material and immaterial, then he introduces immaterial happiness as a 
preliminary step for the mystical journey. In chapter eight of Remarks and Admonitions, 
he addresses the different kinds of immaterial joy and happiness that he sees as being 
connected to the division of the world. Avicenna divides happiness into an internal and a 
material happiness. He claims that internal happiness is superior to material happiness.  
It had occurred to the common minds that strong and lofty pleasures are those   of 
the senses, while other pleasures are weak and are all unreal objects of the 
imagination. It is possible to draw the attention of one who belongs to this group 
and who is capable of distinction. Thus, it can be said to this person is not sex, 
food and what resembles them the most pleasurable thing in this class that you 
describe? However, you know that one who is capable of a particular victory, 
even in a trivial matter such as chess or backgammon, would reject food or sex if 
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presented with them. This is due to imagined pleasure of victory that one 
experienced.112 
Avicenna believes in the sensible and immaterial world by comparing sensible and 
spiritual pleasures. Likewise, he claims that spiritual pleasure holds a higher position than 
sensible pleasure. Avicenna remarks that sensible pleasures are external but spiritual 
pleasures are internal.113 Thus, we can come to conclusion that Avicenna divides the 
world into internal and external world with his division of pleasure. The external world is 
the world of the senses, and the internal world has several divisions. 
According to Avicenna, spiritual pleasure belongs to the internal world. The internal has 
another classification that is higher than imaginal world. The higher classification of the 
internal world belongs to the intellectual world, as the intellectual pleasures occupy a 
higher place in Avicenna’s hierarchy.114 
Another division of the internal world according to Avicenna is the dominion world 
(ʿālam Malakūt). This world occupies the highest position among the other worlds—
sensible, imaginal and intellectual. The seeker of the Truth can attain the dominion world 
though the purification of their soul.115 Avicenna remarks that attaining the dominion 
world can be reached before the separation of the soul from the body.  
This pleasure is not completely lacking when the soul is in the body. Rather, those 
who indulge in reflecting on the divine power and who abandon preoccupations 
with the body achieve, while in the body, an abundant portion of this pleasure, 
which may take hold of them, thus distracting them from everything else.116 
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As the above quotation demonstrates, Avicenna does not offer a clear division of the 
world directly. However, he presents the classification of happiness and the levels of the 
soul, which means that each happiness belongs to its own world. The general 
classification of the world is the internal and external world. The external world is the 
material world that gives minor pleasure and happiness to people, while the internal 
world has several subdivisions, such as the imaginal world, intellectual world and 
dominion world.   
The intellectual world has been further divided into four subdivisions by Avicenna. The 
potential intellect (ʿaql bil quwah), the habitual intellect (ʿaql bil malaka), the actual 
intellect (ʿaql bil fʿil) and the active intellect (ʿaql faʿāl). Each individual, regardless of 
material or immortal substance, possesses the potential intellect. The habitual intellect is 
something that can be acquired through habit. The third stage is the actual intellect, which 
means that the human, by means of the primary truths, can acquire the secondary truths 
without any help from the sensitive or imaginative faculties. The final and highest 
position in the hierarchy of intellects belongs to the active intellect. The active intellect is 
the union between apprehension (idrāk) and apprehender (mudrik).117 
It is beneficial to note that the role of subjectivity in the division of the world is 
important. Avicenna divides the world into external and internal, but the core of this 
division is the human and not the cosmos. According to Avicenna, the external world is 
something outside of the human, whereas the internal world is immaterial and within the 
human mind. Furthermore, what can be seen in Avicenna’s system of thinking is that the 
human is considered as the world (ʿālam aṣghar). The sensible dimension of the human 
is alongside the material world, and the internal part is connected with the non-material 
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world,118 as well as the intellectual and  dominion world. Therefore, the seeker of the 
Truth, according to Avicenna, should pass to the subdivisions of the internal world. 
Al-Ghazālī divides the world, the whole cosmos, into two different segments: the seen 
and the unseen. Al-Ghazālī refers to the first and lowest segment as the sensible and 
material world. The higher and non-material world is named the spiritual and unseen 
world. Al-Ghazālī believes in the dualistic world, or the bodily and spiritual world.119   
The visible and sensible world for al-Ghazālī is the material world, which is connected 
with the unseen world.  Al-Ghazālī highlights that the sensible world is like darkness and 
the spiritual world is light. He further remarks that just as the exhibition of light is 
required to be alongside darkness, the material world is alongside the spiritual world. 
Likewise, al-Ghazālī believes that the seeker of the Truth needs to journey through the 
seen and material world if he wants to acquire the unseen world. Therefore, the material 
world is like a ladder for ascending the hierarchy; without the ladder, the seeker cannot 
advance in their journey for the Truth.120 
Know also that the visible world in relation to the world of dominion is like the 
shell in the relation to the kernel, the form and the mold in the relation to the 
spirit, darkness in relation in the light and the low in relation to high. That is why 
the dominion world called the “high world,” the “spiritual world,” and the 
“luminous world,” while standing opposite to it is the low, corporeal, and the dark 
world. And do not suppose that by the “high world” we mean the heaven, since 
they are “high” and “above” only in the respect to visible and sensible world, and 
the beasts share in perceiving them.121 
                                                 
118.The non-material world is not a part of the whole universe; instead, it is a part of the human.  
119.Al-Ghazālī, (1998), 26.  
120. Ibid., 27. 
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Al-Ghazālī believes that the unseen world would be unveiled for the real seeker; thus, the 
seeker of the Truth should explore the unseen world. Al-Ghazālī utilizes Qur’anic 
verse122 to explain that the cosmic position of the people who have business in the 
sensible world is equivalent to the animal. 
When this has been unveiled to you with a complete unveiling. Then the first door 
of the world of dominion will have been opened to you. In this world there are 
wonders in relation to which the visible world will be disdained. If a person does 
not travel to this world, then, while incapacity makes him sit in the lowland of the 
visible world. He remains a beast deprived  of the specific characteristic of 
humanity.123 
There is another classification of the unseen world; it is the world for special servants. 
The special servants are people who abandon the material world because the unseen 
world attracts them. These people are seekers of the Truth who do not have any concerns 
regarding the material and the sensible because the illuminations of the Truth embrace 
them. 
As for servant, the door to the world of dominion will not open for him and he 
will not become “dominional” (malakūti) unless, in relation to him, the earth 
changes to other than earth and the heaven [ to other than the heavens]. Then 
everything that enters into the senses and imagination will become his earth and 
this includes the heavens; and whatever stands beyond the sense will be his 
heaven. This is the first ascent for every traveler who has begun his journey to the 
proximity of Lordly Presence (ḥaẓrat al-rubūbīat).124 
                                                 
122. Qur’an, 7:179. 
123. Al-Ghazālī, (1998), 11. 
124. Ibid., 11. 
58 
 
  
Another segment of the unseen world belongs to prophets, and this is called the world of 
“holiness.” According to al-Ghazālī, prophets know everything from both the unseen and 
seen world. They have access to the visible world and the unseen world equally, and as a 
result they know the mysteries and hidden commands of both worlds. 
When the ascent of the prophets reaches its farthest point, when they look down 
from there upon the low, and when they gaze from top to bottom, they become 
informed of the heart of the servants and gaze upon certain amount of the science 
of the unseen. For when someone is in the world of dominion (malakūti)  he is 
with God, “ and with him are the keys to unseen”[6:59]125 
The world of “holiness”, according to al-Ghazālī, is beyond the senses and the 
imagination because having access to the meaning of holiness in the world of holiness is 
not easy for everybody.  
No one comes near to God unless he steps into the midst of the enclosure of 
holiness. What we mean by the world of “holiness” is the world that is elevated 
beyond the perception of the senses and the imagination.126 
Al-Ghazālī, believes that the seen and sensible world is caused by the unseen world. He 
suggests that the unseen world is the secondary cause of the seen world because the First 
Cause and the absolute agent is God. 
From the God, the secondary causes of existent things descend into visible world, 
while the visible world is one of the effects of the world of dominion. The visible 
world comes forth from the world of dominion just as the shadow comes forth 
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from the thing that throw it, the fruit comes forth from the three, and the effect 
comes forth from the secondary cause.127 
One commonality in the philosophy of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī is that both divide the 
world into the outward world (zāhir) and the inward world (bātin). Another similarity 
between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī is the position of the sensible world. Both believe that 
the sensible world is in the lowest position in the cosmos. Further, they claim that the 
external and sensible world is a visible world that humans can feel and see by his or her 
senses. 
The most important difference between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s categorization of 
worlds is their terminology. Avicenna, for example, named the unseen world the 
intellectual and holiness world. In comparison, the unseen world for al-Ghazālī is the 
Qur’an,128 “the world of dominion; it is the Qur’an and the revealed books of God.”129 
Then, he classifies the unseen world as the world for special servants and prophets.  
On the other hand, Avicenna divides the intellectual world into four groups: potential, 
habitual, actual and active intellect. Then, there is the higher level of the world, which he 
names the holiness world. For Avicenna, the intellectual worlds and dominion world are 
accessible for both prophets and the gnostics. Further, the relation between the unseen 
world and seen world is cause and effect. 
Another important difference in Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s world classifications is that 
the division of the world, according to Avicenna, is the human. In other words, the 
internal world for Avicenna is the stage for human intellect. In contrast, Al-Ghazālī 
divides the universe into the internal and external, which suggests that the external world 
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has an unseen element. Thus, the unseen world is not separate from the seen, material 
world, according to al-Ghazālī.  
What is revealed through this comparison of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s work is that they 
believe that humans are capable of different levels of thinking and spirituality, which 
results in dissimilar perspectives of reality.  
3.3 The Division of People 
Only the bravest people who pass through the material life and are attracted by the divine 
emanation (fīḍ ilāhī) are capable of commencing the journey toward the Truth. The idea 
that the path of Truth is only for people with the potentiality of awareness has always 
been the main focus of great thinkers like Avicenna and al-Ghazālī. Hence, the great 
thinkers write their texts for special people who are able to comprehend the depth 
meaning of their work. The focus of the current subchapter is to explore the division of 
people according to Avicenna and al-Ghazālī.  
There are two groups of people for Avicenna: the gnostics and the non-gnostics. 
According to Avicenna, a gnostic is a person who is in love with the absolute Truth. The 
knowers, or gnostics, have the highest position in Avicenna’s classification of people. 
Avicenna believes that the focus for the gnostics is the Truth.  
The name ‘gnostic’ (ʿārif)  is reserved for one who disposes one’s thought toward 
the sanctity of divine power, seeking the perpetual illumination of the light of the 
Truth into one’s innermost thought.130 
Avicenna divides the non-gnostics into two groups: the worshippers (ʿābid) and the 
ascetic (zāhid).  
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The name ‘ascetic’ (zāhid) is reserved for one who shuns the delights and goods 
of this world. the name ‘worshipper’ is reserved for one who persists in exercising 
the worship by prostration, fasting and what resemble them.131 
The basic duty in all religions is praying. Avicenna, however, highlights the difference 
between the praying of the gnostics and the non-gnostics. 
Worship for non-gnostic is kind of business deal, as if one acts in the present life 
for salary that one will receive in the second life as retribution and reward. But for 
gnostic it is kind of exercise of one’s faculties, including the estimative and 
imaginative powers of one’s soul, to orient them by habit from the side of error to 
the side of the Truth.132 
Moreover, the main part of chapters nine and ten of Remarks and Admonitions focus on 
asceticism. However, Avicenna differentiates between the asceticism of the gnostics and 
the non-gnostics.  
 Asceticism (zuhd) for non-gnostic is a kind of business deal, as if one buys the 
delights of the second life with the delights of the present one. But for the gnostic 
it is a kind of abstinence from that which distracts one’s innermost thought from 
the Truth and elevation over everything other than the Truth.133 
 Death has been a significant fear for human beings; yet, death for the gnostics is like a 
gate that can help them attain absolute freedom and union with the Truth.  
In their present life, the gnostics have stations and ranks that are reserved for them 
to the exclusion of others. It is as if, while being clothed by their bodies, they 
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have shed their bodies, become free from them and attained the world of 
dominion.  To them belong things concealed in them and things manifested by 
them. The latter are protested against by those who deny them and are considered 
as great by those who know them.134 
 In the last part of chapter nine, Avicenna claims that the gnostics do not have any 
religious duties such as praying and fasting. The reason for this is that religious duties are 
only for two groups of people: the sinners and the people who understand the imposition 
of religious duties. 
The knower may be inattentive to the thing by virtue of which he reaches the 
Truth. Thus, he becomes ignorant of everything around him. Therefore, he is in 
the same class as those on whom religious duties are not imposed. How could this 
be otherwise, when religious duties are imposed only on one who understands the 
imposition of religious duties at the time one understands it, and on one who 
becomes a sinner for not abiding by the religious duties, even though he does not 
but has the capacity for doing so.135 
According to the evidence from chapter nine of Remarks and Admonitions, one might 
argue that Avicenna’s discussion of praying is rather vague. This impression is created by 
the fact that praying can have different meanings for Avicenna. When Avicenna 
highlights the praying of the gnostics, he does not mean praying in the context of 
religious duties. Therefore, praying can have different meanings for Avicenna, such as 
preoccupation with the Truth and remembering the Truth at every moment. So, praying 
based on an Islamic structure is not the primary focus for Avicenna. 
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Another aspect worth noting about the division of people according to Avicenna is that he 
does not clarify the position of prophets in his philosophical system (prophecy). 
However, in his classification, he describes the gnostics and the non-gnostics. Therefore, 
it is possible to infer that in Avicenna’s philosophical system, the prophets belong to the 
same category as the gnostics; the prophets and the gnostics walk the same path. It can be 
questioned what the difference is between the prophets and the gnostics if they belong to 
the same group of people. In order to address this question of difference between the 
prophets and the gnostics, one must look beyond chapters nine and ten of Remarks and 
Admonitions to Avicenna’s Shifā ( Healing).136  
In another one of Avicenna’s works, al-Nijāt (The Book of Salvation), he returns to his 
classification of the stations of the intellect, and names another type that belongs to the 
prophets, or, as he describes them, the people who possess the highest potentiality to 
connect with the Truth. Avicenna claims that prophets actually have attained all 
knowledge and gnosis by themselves. They are not in need of anyone to direct them 
toward anything. This quality belongs to people who possess exceptionally great natural 
capacities: (dharfyyat tabīʿī).137 Thus, prophets can be distinguished from the gnostics by 
that fact that the prophet is a person of extraordinary intellectual endowment. As a result 
of this endowment, the prophets are able to know all things without the instruction of an 
external source. On the other hand, the gnostics need some preparation for connecting to 
the Truth because the gnostics do not have the highest natural capacity or extraordinary 
intellectual endowment. 
Common people who do not fall under Avicenna’s categories of gnostics, worshipers, 
and ascetics do not have any place in his system. According to Avicenna, ordinary people 
are not important enough to be classified. 
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Al-Ghazālī divides people into three distinct groups: the common people, the elect, and 
the elect of the elect. It is beneficial to note that there is a straight connection between the 
classification of light and the division of the people in al-Ghazālī’s framework.  
Al-Ghazālī contends that common people are not capable of accessing any experiences 
beyond the sensible world; therefore, their understanding of the universe is based on their 
senses. The origin of the universe is the Light of Lights, and the light comes in an 
analogical gradation. Thus, the light has a material presence for common people who 
comprehend the world via the senses.138 
After classifying people into the three groups outlined above, al-Ghazālī offers another 
classification system for people that is based on the classification of the human spirit 
(rūḥ). The human spirit can be divided into five groups: the sensible (ḥasās), imaginal 
(khīālī), rational (ʿaqlī), reflective (fikrī) and prophetic spirit (nabawī). The relationship 
between the human spirit and the station of people in the cosmos is important for al-
Ghazālī, as he believes that it is through the classification of people’s spirit that they can 
be divided into the common, elect, and the elect of elect categories. 
The first type of human spirit is the sensible spirit, which belongs to the five senses. The 
sensible spirit is common between both humans and animals. The second stage is the 
imaginative spirit; its responsibility is to organize and store the information brought in by 
the senses. Also, the imaginative spirit presents information for the rational spirit when 
necessary. The rational spirit serves as a border that separates humans from other 
creatures. The reflective spirit takes pure rational knowledge and facilitates combination 
and analogy. The last stage of the human spirit, the holy prophetic spirit, is dedicated to 
the elect of elect people and prophets. The holy prophetic spirit has access to seen and 
unseen knowledge without additional help from the material world.139 
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According to the above discussion, the main difference between Avicenna and al-
Ghazālī’s division of people is that al-Ghazālī has a much more comprehensive 
classification than Avicenna. 
Avicenna divides people into two main categories: the gnostics and the non-gnostics. The 
gnostics category contains all aware people ranging from philosophers to prophets. The 
worshipers and the ascetics belong to the non-gnostics category, and everyone else—the 
common people—are not worth classifying in Avicenna’s system.  
Al-Ghazālī divides people into different groups, such as common people and elect 
people. Further, there is a distinct category for the prophets, which does not have any 
connection with other people because prophets for al-Ghazālī are the elect of elect who 
have been sent by God. Moreover, al-Ghazālī presents a classification for elect people, 
and within this classification the elect people have different kinds of levels. For example, 
there are elect people who are veiled by light or by light alongside with darkness.  
3.4 The Path Toward the Truth  
The goal of Islamic mysticism is to experience the Truth and to be satisfied by that 
experience. The seeker of the Truth should proceed in the direction that leads him to an 
indescribable experience of union with the Truth. Thus, entrance onto the path to the 
Truth requires preparation. In the sciences, for example, fields such as physics require 
knowledge of mathematics and other basic skills. Along the same lines, the mystic path 
needs either inward or outward preparations, praying or meditation to help seekers to 
understand the importance of this way. Some Muslim philosophers like Avicenna believe 
that the gnostics need meditation. Other Muslim scholars like al-Ghazālī believe in both 
internal and external preparation. For Al-Ghazālī, external preparation means the Islamic 
practices, praying, fasting and being obedient to Islamic law.  
 Avicenna’s description of mysticism is based on rationality and love. For Avicenna, love 
engulfs the whole universe. Every being has enjoyed this love as a result of their natural 
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potentiality. However, this love that surrounds the whole universe has a hierarchy. Also, 
there is a relationship between this love and the depth of thinking.140   
 On the other hand, al-Ghazālī’s world-view is based on the Islamic framework and a new 
idea that he introduced, taste (ḥikah al-dhawqī).  Avicenna’s primary focus for his 
mysticism is love (ʿīshq), as it has been defined in his epistle of love. In comparison, the 
foundation of al-Ghazālī’s mysticism is Islam, but an Islam that relies on taste and 
inclination (dhawq) more than knowledge. Moreover, al-Ghazālī believes that rational 
thinkers are the masters of taste. Also, according to al-Ghazālī, knowledge is above faith 
and taste is above knowledge.141 Though Al-Ghazālī does not offer a clear definition of 
taste, the meaning can still be gleaned from his writing. From al-Ghazālī’s perspective, 
taste is a characteristic that allows people to acquire special talent.  For example, al-
Ghazālī claims that the poet has the taste of poem. Al-Ghazālī considers taste as a faculty 
of human beings. 
If you desire a similitude of this taken from all the characteristics we witness in 
some people, then consider how taste in poetry, which is a kind of sensation and 
perception, is singled out for a single group of men. Some people are so deprived 
of this taste that, for them, harmonious melodies cannot be distinguished from the 
disharmonious. Consider also how the strength of taste within some people is so 
great that they derive from music, song, strings instruments and many types of 
musical modes which produce sadness, delight, sleep, laughter, madness, slaying 
and loss of consciousness. These effects are only strong in one who possesses the 
root of this taste.142 
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On the other hand, Avicenna defines taste (dhawq) quite differently from al-Ghazālī’s 
definition. According to Avicenna, taste is the certainty of certain pleasure.  
It may be that one can affirm a certain pleasure with certainty, but if the notion 
called ‘taste’ (dhawq) does not occur, it is permissible for us not to find desire for 
this pleasure. Similarly, one can affirm a certain harm with certainty, but if the 
notion called ‘being subject to suffering’ (al-muqāsāt) does not occur, it is 
permissible not to be highly caution of this harm143. 
Avicenna defines taste as the perception of pleasure, such as how a person who is 
physically unable to have sex cannot have a preparedness to have sex.144 However, al-
Ghazālī defines taste as the characteristic that allows the possessor of taste to acquire 
special talent.  
Next, I am going to explain what kind of preparation the seeker of the Truth requires to 
experience the Truth according to Avicenna and al-Ghazālī.  Avicenna, in chapter nine of 
Remarks and Admonitions, highlights that the first step for the seekers of the Truth is 
willingness (al-irāda). Hence, the first move towards the Truth would commence from 
the seeker. The seeker would want to experience the Truth and to be satisfied by 
connecting with the Truth. But the meaning of willingness needs to be clear according to 
Avicenna. 
Avicenna remarks that the willingness is the desire toward the Truth. Hence, this desire 
overcomes the seeker’s insight.145 Also, Avicenna defines love as a desire, a natural 
desire toward the object of love as well. So, it can be argued that love is the cause of 
movement toward the Truth. However, this love of humans for the Truth must be 
considered alongside the awareness that for other beings it is a natural desire. Avicenna 
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believes there are two ways to attain this willingness, faith (īmān) and demonstrative 
certainty (burhān yaqīnī). Based on the philosophical structure of Avicenna’s paradigm, 
demonstrative certainty is attainable philosophically and rationally. However, Avicenna 
does not offer an accurate definition of faith in Remarks and Admonitions. Yet, in the 
epistle about the quiddity of praying (māhīat ṣalāt) Avicenna relies on the prophet’s 
utterance about the faith: “no faith in those who do not pray from him” (lā īmān li man lā 
ṣalāt lah). Avicenna then explains two different kinds of praying, namely external and 
internal. According to Avicenna, external praying is what Islam introduced to Muslim 
people, 5 daily prayers. Internal praying belongs to special people and is about observing 
the Truth through the purification of the heart.146 Avicenna believes that the human soul 
(nafs insānī) is heart.147 Therefore, according to the above discussion, faith for Avicenna 
is the observation of the Truth through the purification of the heart. By clarifying the way 
of purification, Avicenna introduces asceticism. A major part of chapter nine of Remarks 
and Admonitions is dedicated to asceticism (zuhd).  
According to Avicenna, austerity (rīāẓat) is required for the seeker of the Truth. Austerity 
for Avicenna is asceticism, which is a purification of the heart and all thinking except for 
that which leads to the Truth.148 The meaning of real asceticism is to purify the heart and 
rational faculties, such as the imagination, of all things other than the Truth. Therefore, 
austerity prepares the seeker for experiencing the Truth. 
It can be questioned what is the result of willingness and asceticism according to 
Avicenna. The answer to this question is that willingness and asceticism assist the seeker 
in preparing for encountering the pleasurable experience with the light of the Truth. In 
this experience, the seeker can observe the short illumination from the light, which is the 
Truth.  Avicenna named these kinds of experiences that the seeker encounters at the 
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beginning of his path ‘moments’ (awqāt).149 He highlights that if the seeker performs 
spiritual exercise, he will experience the light of the Truth. Thus, asceticism plays an 
important role in experiencing the Truth. 
 Avicenna believes that asceticism has an impact on the soul, as it makes the soul of the 
seeker tranquil. As well, the seeker would experience the situation in such a way that he 
could have a journey toward the Truth while he is awake. Additionally, asceticism makes 
the seeker connected to the Truth in every moment by the wish of the seeker.150    
Avicenna’s asceticism does not suggest that the seeker should abandon the material world 
and avoid people to experience the Truth. Instead, he introduces a path to the Truth that is 
supported by rationality and pure love. Moreover, his mysticism is completely internal 
asceticism, which means the purification of thinking from all but God. The seeker cannot 
pay attention to himself, as this would be a preoccupation with the non-Truth. The exact 
definition of Avicenna’s mysticism is practicing thinking to focus on the Truth by 
asceticism.  
He abandons himself, thus, he notices the side of sanctity only. If he notices his 
self he does so inasmuch as it notices the Truth, and not inasmuch as it is 
ornamented with the pleasure of having the Truth. At this point the arrival is real. 
Paying attention to whatever the Truth revealed (nāzil) is preoccupation.151 
Though al-Ghazālī does not define Sufism in The Niche of Lights, his definition of it can 
be explored in his other works. He primarily defines Sufism based on Islamic values, the 
law of Allah, and the right of people. It is necessary to explain these Islamic values for 
comprehending al-Ghazālī’s definition of Sufism. 
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The right of Allah refers to absolute obedience to the commands of Allah, such as fasting 
and praying. The right of people means to treat people nicely; however, al-Ghazālī 
believes that other people’s behaviour should fall within the Islamic framework of law, 
Sharʿīa. Drawing on these two Islamic values, al-Ghazālī explains the real meaning of 
Sufism in the following way: “Sufism consists of two things: the honesty and truthfulness 
with God (ṣidq ma’ Allāh) and good behavior with people.”152 Al-Ghazālī introduces 
these two qualities for the Sufi to distinguish the real Sufi from people who claim they 
are Sufi. 
Al-Ghazālī, with his definition of Sufism based on the Islamic framework, suggests that 
the seeker of the Truth would be real Sufi because real Sufi would not violate the Islamic 
law that was sent by Allah. Thus, it is clear that the first step for being Sufi is obedience 
of Islamic law, which is an external action. The second step of being Sufi and to prepare 
for the illumination of the Light of Lights is the purification of the inner self from the 
darkness of imagination and sense perception.153 
 Al-Ghazālī does not explain in The Niche of Lights how the Sufi can be purified from the 
darkness and murkiness. However, exploring other his works shows the ways of 
purification.  
One of the best ways to purify the heart is to remember God. Remembering God (dhikr) 
has two aspects, one external and the other internal. The seeker of the Truth would start 
by remembering God by his tongue (lisān). If the seeker persists on remembering God by 
the tongue and makes it a habit, then the seeker would move on to the internal aspect: 
remembering God with heart and without tongue.154  
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Thenceforth, al-Ghazālī introduces another step that he calls meditation (murāqibh). 
Meditation occurs after purification because al-Ghazālī believes that purification opens 
the gates to the divine realm. So, meditation for al-Ghazālī is the observation of the Truth 
with the continuity of insight. Also, meditation develops from observing with one’s eyes 
and exploring the lights of the unity of the Truth.155 Thus, it requires an internal journey 
toward the observation of the Truth through the internal eye—the heart. 
Divine knowledge (ʿilm ladunī) is the fruit of purification and meditation. Al-Ghazālī 
remarks that divine knowledge is the light of inspiration (ilhām) that will help lead the 
seeker to the Truth. The other important element for attaining divine knowledge is 
reflection. Al-Ghazālī does not believe that just any type of thinking can lead to the 
observation of the light of Truth. 
 The seeker should think about his thoughts and evaluate them to guide him toward the 
hidden gates of divine knowledge.156 According to al-Ghazālī, thinking is the connection 
between the soul (nafs) and the universal soul (nafs kulī). This kind of thinking leads to 
the divine knowledge that belongs to the elect people, and to the elect of the elect.157 
Therefore, real and accurate knowledge can be attained through the connection between 
the human soul and the universal soul. Divine knowledge is the only trustworthy and 
infallible knowledge.  
The last step for the Sufi is annihilation (fanā), which results when the Sufi loses all of 
his identities158 and acquires the union with the Truth. 
                                                 
155. Ibid., 179. 
156. Al-Ghazālī, (1416 A.H), 235. 
157. Ibid., 230.  
158. Identification means the Sufi should lose whatever would hinder him from the union with the 
Truth.  
72 
 
  
When this state gets the upper hand, it is called ‘extinction’ (fanā) in relation to 
one who possesses it. Or, rather, it is called ‘extinction from extinction’ (fanā al-
fanā’) since the possessor of the state is extinct from himself and from his own 
extinction. For he is conscious (yashʿar) neither of himself in that state, nor of his 
own unconsciousness of himself. If he were conscious of his own 
unconsciousness, then he would [still] be conscious of himself. In the relation to 
the one immersed in it, this state is called “unification,” according to the language 
of metaphor, or is called “declaring God’s unity,” according to the language of 
reality.159  
Both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī acknowledge that the seeker requires preparation for 
becoming Sufi and experiencing the Truth. Willingness and asceticism are what 
Avicenna offers as the basic steps toward the Truth. The Sufi would be prepared by 
purification (tazkīh), meditation (murāqibh) and thinking (tafakur), according to al-
Ghazālī. 
There is a similarity between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī regarding the basic steps of 
mysticism. Firstly, both emphasize purification and asceticism, which means purifying 
the inner self from everything but the Truth. This purification is considered an Islamic 
value known as (khulūṣ).  
Based on al-Ghazālī’s mysticism, the Sufi can be distinguished from other people who 
pretend to be Sufis by two qualities that have been introduced when al-Ghazālī defines 
Sufism. On the contrary, Avicenna believes the gnostic does not have any religious duties 
due to preoccupation with the Truth, as was explained previously. 
Another major difference between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī is their philosophies 
regarding the goal of mysticism. Avicenna highlights that the goal mysticism is to 
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experience the union with God. The goal of mysticism for al-Ghazālī, however, is the 
acquisition of divine knowledge (ʿilm ladunī). An exploration of Avicenna’s work reveals 
that experiencing the union of the Truth is much more important than gaining divine 
knowledge. Al-Ghazālī describes two different declarations of God’s unity, which shows 
the union with God indirectly. One of these declarations is directed towards the common 
people: “There is no gods but God.” The second declaration of God’s unity is “There is 
no god but He,” and this is directed towards the elect people. Whereas the first 
declaration is fairly straightforward, the latter declaration raises some questions. 
“There is no god but He” alludes to an element of Islam that has meaning too deep for 
common people to grasp, as common people only see the surface of reality. This Sufi 
phrase points to God in everything, and this implies that the core is the human. Therefore, 
the Sufi path is just the remembrance of this reality, which is the union of God and 
human. 
Hence, there is no god but He. For “god” is an expression for that toward which a 
face turns through worship and becoming godlike (wajh Allāh). Here I mean the 
faces of the hearts, since they are lights. Indeed, there is no god but He, so also 
there is no he but He, because “he” is an expression for whatever may be pointed 
to, and there is no pointing to anything but Him. Or, rather, whenever you point to 
something, in reality you are pointing to Him……………………...Therefore, 
“there is no god but God” is the declaration of God’s unity for common people, 
while “there is no god but He” is the declaration of God’s unity of the elect, since 
this declaration of God’s unity is more complete, more specific, more 
comprehensive, more worthy and more precise. It is more able to make its 
possessor enter into sheer singularity and utter oneness. 160 
3.5 Engraving the Divine Image Upon the Human Soul 
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The seeker commences along the mystical path by purification, meditation, thinking, or 
willingness and asceticism, moving toward an indescribable experience of the union with 
the Truth. Also, the mystical experience that is a part of the Sufi path has analogical 
gradation (tashkīk), as each step of the mystical journey differs from but is related to the 
other steps. The mystical experience is like a fleeting spark at the start, but it will develop 
into a fire that burns the seeker if the seeker persists on his or her path. 
The goal of the Sufi path is to achieve the connection between the human soul and the 
divine realm. The divine realm is totally beyond the material world. Therefore, the seeker 
must be equipped with non-sensory perception to comprehend the divine realm. 
There is a significant contention regarding these religious experiences, specifically about 
how they occur and how the human soul is capable of connecting with the divine realm. 
Muslim scholars like Avicenna and al-Ghazālī attempt philosophically to confirm the 
truth of these mystical experiences. Avicenna and al-Ghazālī argue how divine images 
(taṣāwīr ilāhīyya) engrave upon the human soul. Hence, the soul is the bridge between 
the seen and the unseen world. Moreover, both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī use the 
metaphor of the mirror for showing the reflection of the human soul from the divine 
realm. Both authors utilize this mirror metaphor, as the mirror reflects images 
specifically, comprehensively and clearly, eliminating any murkiness. 
Avicenna’s theory of reflecting the divine image on the human soul is that he claims the 
human soul is not a physical or corporeal being.161 According to Avicenna, the human 
soul is non-material, but it belongs to material.162 Avicenna, however, does not explain 
the connection between immaterial, the soul, and the material body.  
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Avicenna, in his major work Healing (Shifāʾ), outlines eight reasons that explain the 
separation between the body and soul as part of his discussion about natural philosophy 
(țabīʾyāt). As the human soul does not have any material and physical characteristics, the 
real function of the human soul is to comprehend intelligible(maʾqūlāt)163.  
The mystical path is the path along which the soul can abandon material preoccupations 
that are created by the senses, referring to its original characteristic, which is the 
comprehending of intelligible. Avicenna commences his introduction about how the 
divine image engraves upon the human soul with the claim of notification from some 
events in the future. Avicenna remarks that the gnostics are capable of seeing some future 
incidents164 and thereby argues that they can be informed about it. 
Avicenna attempts to prove his statement about the gnostics’ ability to see the future by 
linking it to the relationship between the human and the divine realms via the human 
soul. Avicenna highlights that the human soul can receive imprints from the intelligible 
world based on two conditions: first, through the preparation of the human soul by 
asceticism; and secondly, by removing the obstacles from the soul through depth of 
thoughts, going beyond the surface.165 
According to Avicenna, the human soul can connect to the divine realm and receive these 
divine images only if it is at peace and far from any material preoccupation. Once the 
human soul connects to the realm of sanctity, images of the invisible world are inscribed 
on the human soul. Then, these representations of the invisible world flow to the world of 
imagination, where the images are engraved into the receiver’s common sense (ḥiss 
                                                 
163. Avicenna, (1404 A.H), Chapter6, the second article, 182. 
164. Avicenna, (1375C.E), 150. 
165. Ibid., 151. 
76 
 
  
mushtarik).166 Common sense, based on Avicenna’s definition, is the accumulation of 
these senses. 
The common sense is the tablet of imprints (tanaqush). When the imprints take 
hold of this tablet, they enter the class of observed things. A sensible thing that 
produces an imprint may be removed from the external sense, while its form 
remains in the common sense for a short time. Thus, it remains in the class of 
observed things and not those imagined………. Thus, if the form is represented in 
the tablet of common sense, it becomes observed (mushāhidah). 167 
Engraving the images from the invisible world happens either during a state in which the 
body is only mildly preoccupied by the senses like during sleep, or in the state of a 
certain illness that makes the senses weak. The human soul can only connect to the 
invisible world when its senses are in a feeble state. The imagination would return to the 
images from the invisible world and receive them completely. Hence, the imagination 
would engrave the accepted images upon the common sense. The common sense begins 
to find the closest image from memory that matches the images from the invisible world, 
and then those representatives are stored in the memory.168 
 Therefore, Avicenna emphasizes that both revelation and inspiration need to be 
interpreted for the clarification of their real meaning.  
Whether in the state of wakefulness or sleep, is either inspiration(ilhām), a pure 
revelation (waḥy), or a dream that does not require interpretation or expression. 
But that which itself has ceased, while its semblances and effects remain, requires 
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168. Ibid., 154. 
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one of two: revelation requires interpretation (tafsīr) and dream requires 
explanation (tʿawīl).169 
It is worth noting that inspiration and revelation are the effect of the connection between 
the human soul and the divine realm. The divine realm is nonmaterial, whereas what has 
been stored in the human mind comes from the material and physical world through 
experience. Consequently, once the human soul connects to the divine realm, it receives 
intelligible images that are not material. As result, inspiration and revelation require 
interpretation to clarify their real meaning. 
Al-Ghazālī supports the dualistic idea of the body and soul, as his classification of the 
world into the seen and the unseen realms suggests this dualism. Al-Ghazālī highlights 
that the soul belongs to the divine realm because it is eternal and cannot be eliminated by 
death. 
The soul is the heart that is known by an inner eye and your reality is your inner 
side not your body……... the heart is not a piece of meat in your left side of your 
chest.  Because the animal and dead people have a heart. Everything that can be 
seen by external eyes belong to the world that named the visible world. But, the 
Truth of the heart does not exist in this world, it belongs to the invisible world. 
Therefore, the heart (the soul) is a stranger in the visible world.170 
 According to al-Ghazālī, the human soul belongs to the invisible world and the goal of 
mysticism is to attain divine knowledge (ʿīlm ladunī). Divine knowledge imprints upon 
the human soul if the human soul is prepared to acquire divine knowledge. Al-Ghazālī 
explains how divine knowledge imprints upon the human based on the Qur’an.171 
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Al-Ghazālī commences his description of receiving divine knowledge with the use of a 
premise. The premise is the first waystation that the gnostics pass through on their 
journey to the divine kingdom and the purification of the murkiness of the imagination 
and senses that is required. He explains that the only concern for the gnostics is a focus 
on the Truth. Therefore, the gnostics should abandon both worlds, this world and the 
next. 
If one is only able to walk in this holy riverbed by throwing off both this world 
and the next world and by turning one’s face toward the One, the Real—because 
this world and the next world are two contraries and counterparts, and because 
they are accidents of the luminous human substance and can be thrown off at one 
time and put on at another. 172 
Al-Ghazālī believes that the heart, the soul, is like a mirror that is capable of reflecting 
the divine images that it receives via ‘the preserved tablet’ (al-luḥ al-maḥfūẓ)173. The 
divine knowledge would not transfer from the preserved tablet to the heart unless the 
heart does away with all worldly appetites. According to al-Ghazālī, divine knowledge 
imprints upon the heart because the heart belongs to the divine world.174 
Another crucial point about the imprinting of the divine image upon the heart according 
to al-Ghazālī is that the connection between the heart and the divine world usually 
happens during sleep because sleep causes the emancipation of the heart from the 
preoccupations of the senses. 
                                                 
172. Ibid., 30. 
173. Ibid., 31.  
 Al-Ghazālī remarks that the preserved tablet is the similitude for some receptive substances that are prior 
to other substances to receive the divine image. As a result, they transfer this knowledge to others. 
174. Al-Ghazālī, (1416 A.H) 425. 
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Sleep has an effect on witnessing such as these because the ruling authority of the 
senses forces the person to turn away from the inward divine light, since the 
senses keep him occupied and attract him toward the world of sense perception, 
turning his face away from the world of unseen and dominion.175 
Then, al-Ghazālī clarifies that once the knower connects to the divine dominion, divine 
knowledge imprints upon the heart by the preserved tablet. Next, the imagination faculty 
looks for the similar meaning that is equivalent with the divine image.176 However, al-
Ghazālī does not clearly or specifically explain the exact role of the imagination. Instead, 
al-Ghazālī elucidates the connection between the human and the divine world, and the 
process of acquiring images from the divine world. 
Both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī allude to the important role of the imagination faculty. 
Also, they both remark that sleep is one of the best ways to free the soul from material 
preoccupations.  
3.6 The Interpretation of the Verse Nūr 
I would like to close this chapter with an interpretation of the verse Nūr from Avicenna 
and al-Ghazālī’s perspective for two reasons. First of all, the concept of the light is a key 
focus of Islamic mysticism and philosophy. Moreover, many Muslim philosophers, 
including Avicenna and al-Ghazālī, consider the verse light as a metaphoric verse that 
needs to be explored to determine its meaning.  
The verse Nūr states that: 
“Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The Parable of His Light is as if 
there were a Niche and within it a Lamp: The Lamp enclosed in Glass: the glass 
                                                 
175. Al-Ghazālī, (1998), 34. 
176.Ibid., 35. 
80 
 
  
as it was a brilliant star: Lit from a blessed Tree, an Olive, neither of the east nor 
of the West, whose oil is well-nigh luminous, though fire scarce touched it: Light 
upon Light! Allah doth guide whom He will to His Light: Allah doth set forth 
Parables for men: and Allah doth know all things.”177 
This verse contains some key words and phrases with vague meanings, such as “the 
niche”, “the lamp”, “the glass”, “the blessed tree”, and “the olive oil”. The goal of this 
section is to clarify the meaning of these key words and phrases according to Avicenna 
and al-Ghazālī. Also, it is important to note that Avicenna does not allude to the verse al-
Nūr in Remarks and Admonitions. However, Avicenna does dedicate another work, tisʿa 
Risālih fī al- Ḥikmah wa al-Ṭabīyāt, to explaining and interpreting this verse. 
3.6.1 The Niche 
Avicenna relies on his philosophical knowledge to explain the real meaning of “the 
niche”. He believes that “the niche” is similar to potential intellect (ʿaql bil quwih) 
because “the niche” has the potentiality of being the light. Also, the potential intellect has 
the potentiality of being the actual intellect.178 
Al-Ghazālī’s interpretation of “the niche” is a kind of psychological-philosophical 
interpretation, as his explanation alludes to different layers of the human soul.  
As for the sensible spirit, when you consider its specific characteristic, you find 
that its lights come out of numerous holes, like the two eyes, the two ears, the two 
nostrils, and so forth. Hence the most suitable similitude for this spirit is  in the 
visible world is the niche.179 
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 Avicenna and al-Ghazālī refer to “the niche” as the lowest level of the human soul, and 
the human spirit, respectively. 
3.6.2 The Glass 
The main characteristic of glass is its clarity, which enables it to accept the light in the 
best form. Avicenna utilizes this characteristic of glass to liken “the glass” in the verse 
Nūr to the habitual intellect (ʿaql bil malaka). According to Avicenna, the habitual 
intellect is able to accept the second intelligible ( mʿaqūl al- thānī) readily like “the 
glass” accepts the light easily.180 
The equivalence of “the glass” according to al-Ghazālī is the imaginal spirit.  Al-Ghazālī 
outlines three major characteristics for the imaginal spirit that make it similar to “the 
glass”. 
The first characteristic of the imaginal spirit is that it derives from the clay of the dense, 
low world, which means the imagination faculty receives the image from the material 
world. Then, in the absence of the material object, the imagination re-pictures the 
material object with its color, shape and some specific characteristics. 
Moreover, once the imagination spirit is polished, purified and organized, it is equivalent 
to rational meaning (mʿanāy mʿaqūl). The last characteristic is that the beginning the 
imagination needs to record and organize rational knowledge. The organization of 
knowledge helps the imagination not to be dispersed by the scattering that eliminates 
organization. Al-Ghazālī discusses the characteristics of the imagination spirit, and then 
he explains the relation between imaginal spirit (rūḥ khīyalī) and “the glass”. 
We find these three characteristics in relation to the seen light of the visible world 
only in glass. Originally glass is a dense substance, but once it is purified and 
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made clear, it does not veil the light of lamp. Rather it conveys the light in a 
proper manner. Furthermore, it protects the light from being extinguished by 
violent winds and rough moments. Glass, therefore, is the first similitude for the 
imaginal spirit.181 
3.6.3 The Lamp 
“The lamp” is luminous and has a bright light that produces the light it emits. In the same 
way, the actual intellect (ʿaql bil fʿil) comprehends the knowledge without any assistance 
from anything. Thence, Avicenna highlights that “the lamp” is a metaphor for the actual 
intellect.182 
Al-Ghazālī suggests that the rational spirit (rūḥ ʿaql) is similar to “the lamp” because the 
rational spirit comprehends the noble and divine knowledge. Also, nothing can be hidden 
from the rational faculty.183 
3.6.4 The Tree  
Avicenna remarks that “the tree” is tantamount to thinking because thinking is capable of 
accepting the light after purification. “The tree” was a seed that developed via the earth to 
receive the light of the sun. 184 
On the contrary, al-Ghazālī highlights that the most important characteristic of the 
reflective spirit (rūḥ fikrī) is that it begins with a single root and then branches off from 
there into other branches. Then, each of these new branches divides into two more that 
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produce fruit. These fruit go back to the seed of the same fruit; therefore, “the tree” is 
similar to the reflective spirit.185 
3.6.5 Olive Oil 
Avicenna believes the phrase “well-nigh” expresses the holy intellect (ʿaql qudsī). The 
“olive oil” catches fire without touching the fire, in the same way that the holy intellect 
comprehends the intelligible automatically without any assistance.  
Also, Avicenna stresses the similarity of the active intellect (ʿaql fʿāl) and fire. The 
luminosity of fire leads to the brightness of its environment, and the active intellect is like 
a fire that makes the intelligible clear.186 
Al-Ghazālī expresses the same idea about this part of the verse, “well-nigh luminous, 
though fire scarce touched it.” For al-Ghazālī, this suggests an association with the holy 
prophetic spirit (rūḥ quds nabawī) because it is in the utmost degree of purification and 
nobility.187  
The difference between al-Ghazālī and Avicenna regarding the interpretation of this verse 
is that Avicenna explains the grades of intellect while al-Ghazālī remarks on the level of 
spirit. I can say, both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī explain one reality from two different 
perspectives. Avicenna refers the key word of this verse to the Greek philosophy while 
al-Ghazālī tries to refer to different level of the human soul in Qur’an. 
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Conclusion 
The central concern of this project has been to arrive at an understanding of Islamic 
mysticism from Avicenna and al-Ghazālī ’s perspective. Comparing Avicenna and al-
Ghazālī reveals that al-Ghazālī lived in an age when philosophy had an esteemed place in 
universities and among scholars. Therefore, al-Ghazālī’s intent was to show that the 
Qur’an could be understood in rational terms by interpreting Qur’anic verses through a 
philosophical lens. For example, al-Ghazālī’s understanding of verse Nūr is completely 
philosophical.  However, the Qur’an for Avicenna is religious book that guides common 
people along the right path. Avicenna does not attempt to illustrate the Qur’an as a 
philosophical book; rather, his understanding of the Qur’an is in a philosophical context. 
Avicenna’s book Remarks and Admonitions, and especially chapters nine and ten, 
illustrate a comprehensive framework of Avicenna's mystical world-view. Avicenna 
established his mystical viewpoint through philosophy. Avicenna describes his mystical 
framework as an intellectual journey toward the Truth. This journey starts with self-
contemplation (tʿaaqqul dhātī) and the awareness of the divine realm to form a union 
with the Truth. Intellect and love support the philosophical-mystical journey toward the 
Truth from Avicenna’s perspective. Avicenna emphasizes the collaboration between love 
and intellect in individuals following the philosophical-mystical path. It is important to 
consider how Avicenna’s definition of love is similar to Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’, as this shows 
that both Avicenna and Ikhwān al- Ṣafā’ utilized the same source.  
Perhaps the most important point about Avicenna’s mysticism is that Avicenna divides 
the world into external and internal based on the human. In other words, the human as 
subject is a key focus of Avicenna’s understanding of the division of the world. Thus, the 
external world is beyond the comprehension of the human intellect regardless of whether 
it is a shadow of another world or not. Also, the internal world is inside humans and has 
different layers. Therefore, the seeker of the Truth has to journey inside himself through 
different layers of his being.   
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On the other hand, al-Ghazālī’s The Niche of Lights illustrates the structure of Islamic 
mysticism based on two pillars. The first pillar is the principle of dualism, which means 
that everything in the universe has two aspects or sides: outwards and inwards, 
respectively. However, even though these two sides are totally different and apparently 
incompatible, there is cooperation between them. In Al-Ghazālī’s framework, the 
outward world is the ladder and basic step for the journey toward the inward world. This 
dualism is necessary because without the existence of one, realization of the other would 
not be possible. It is also worth noting that Al-Ghazālī’s division of world mainly focuses 
on a division of the universe and not the human. Although the human is included in his 
paradigm, and it has seen and unseen aspects also, the side that can be seen is a shadow 
of the unseen world.  
The second pillar—which cannot be found in the philosophical systems of other Muslim 
philosophers—is the consideration of the Qur’an and Hadith as two wings for the human 
spiritual journey. Al-Ghazālī firmly connects the two main sources of Islam in his book. 
Also, many of his philosophical and mystical books are the interpretation of the Qur’an 
and Sunna. His well-known book Incoherence of the Philosophers is a refutation of 
philosophers’ arguments on many subjects, including their definition of God as the cause 
of causes, which is against the Qur’anic definition of God. Both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī 
consider the human as (al- ‘alam asghar) and the cosmos as (al- ‘alam akbar), also both 
believe that the external world is material world and the internal world is the immaterial 
world. 
Avicenna divides humans into gnostic (ʿārif) and non-gnostics (ghayr ʿārif); non-gnostics 
are pious (ʿābid) or ascetic (zāhid). Also, gnostics are prophets and saints, but Avicenna 
did not consider common people as worth enough to classify. The division of people, 
according to al-Ghazālī, is: common people; the elect people, which includes saints; 
philosophers and thinkers; and the elect of the elect who are prophets. 
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The comparison of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī clarifies some points that are important to 
mention. First, both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī remark that prophets possess the highest 
natural capacity for receiving revelation and inspiration without the assistance of external 
sources. However, the gnostics need to extend their natural capacity by mysticism. The 
mystical path prepares the gnostics to receive inspiration from the divine realm. Second, 
al-Ghazālī was inspired by Avicenna’s philosophical explanation of the role of the 
imaginative faculty. Avicenna describes the role of the imaginative faculty as a mirror 
that reflects divine images from the holiness world. This mirror reflects the picture 
clearly and completely once all murkiness is polished from the mirror. Thus, the mystical 
path is the path that purifies the imaginative faculty from murkiness in order to reflect 
divine images. Most crucially, Avicenna and al-Ghazālī differ on whether the gnostic 
retains his identity when he confronts the Truth, as the last step of mystical path requires 
either a union with the Truth or annihilation (fanā) once the gnostic loses his identity. 
Avicenna discusses a union between the gnostic and the Truth in which the gnostic keeps 
his identity as a person who observes the Truth. In other words, the gnostic does not have 
an independent identity apart from the Truth. Therefore, the gnostic consciously observes 
both the Truth and himself as an observer of the Truth. On contrary, al-Ghazālī believes 
that the union between the gnostic and the Truth leads the gnostic to relinquish his 
identity because the real identity for the seeker of the Truth is the Truth. The reason that 
al-Ghazālī removes the personal identity of the gnostic is the Qur’anic verse “Everything 
is perishing except His face.”188 Thus, the primary important difference between 
Avicenna and al-Ghazālī is their interpretation of personal identity once the Truth has 
been attained. My perspective is that Avicenna has never ignored the human as subject; 
however, the real subject for al-Ghazālī is the Truth. 
It is important to note that the classification of the human soul, according to al-Ghazālī, is 
equivalent with Avicenna’s classification of the human intellect. The difference between 
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Avicenna and al-Ghazālī’s classification of the human intellect is that al-Ghazālī’s 
division of the human soul is a Qur’anic division not a philosophical one. In other words, 
the division of soul for al-Ghazālī is not an Aristotelian division of soul that includes a 
vegetative soul, animal soul and reasonable soul; rather, his division includes the carnal 
soul (nafs ammārah) and the virtuous soul (nafs mutm’ainnah). Also, both agree that the 
equivalent of the human soul is Sufism’s word ‘heart.’ Avicenna and al-Ghazālī also both 
believe that the verse Nūr needs to be interpreted to unveil its hidden meaning. Further, 
al-Ghazālī and Avicenna contend that this verse illustrates the stages of the human soul or 
intellect, respectively.  
The key difference between Avicenna and al-Ghazālī is that Avicenna claims that Islamic 
law does not apply to the mystics, whereas al-Ghazālī argues that Islamic law applies to 
everyone without any exception.  
My conclusion based on the comparison of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī is that Avicenna 
viewed Islam as separate from his philosophy. Avicenna was more concerned with being 
a great philosopher than perpetuating the adherence of Islamic law. In contrast, al-
Ghazālī’s life was based upon a foundation of Islamic law, philosophy and mysticism. In 
other words, Avicenna used a philosophical lens to explore many different subjects, 
whereas al-Ghazālī utilized an Islamic lens in his work to further Islamic teachings, 
including the Qur’an and Hadith. 
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Glossary  
absolute being (wujūd muțlaq): Necessary Being, that which exists by itself or that 
which cannot but exist, for non-existence of it is unthinkable. 
active intellect (ʿaql faʿāl): a kind of intellectual contact with the divine. This connection 
with the innermost, eternal reality of things is available neither to the ignorant multitude 
nor even to the Sufis (who misunderstand the nature of their mystic experiences), but 
only to philosophers, who grasp by means of their reason the true objects of knowledge: 
immaterial, timeless, universal and intelligible forms. 
actual intellect (ʿaql bil fʿil): Intellect in action or the actualized intellect which, through 
the illumination that it receives from the agent intellect, is activated into thinking upon 
the universal forms of objects as well as ultimate concepts. 
animal emotional soul (Nafs ḥaywānī): The animal soul or mind; it possesses all the 
powers or faculties of the vegetable mind, viz. the nutritive power, the power of growth 
and the power of reproduction. 
annihilation, (fanāʾ): the dissolution of the individuated, finite self 
carnal soul (nafs ammārah): “The commanding soul”, i.e. the soul which is wont to 
enjoin evil, an expression used in the Holy Qur’an (12:53) for the lowest stage in the 
spiritual growth of man, the stage when the low desires and animal passions rule the mind 
of man and he succumbs to his carnal desires like a brute. 
common sense (ḥiss mushtarik): The common sense combines all the forms of the 
sensible objects that are received through the five external senses. 
divine emanation (fayḍ ilāhī): one in which the nature of God (as an absolutely unitary, 
necessary being) overflows in its superabundance, giving rise to a chain of successively 
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dependent ‘intellects’ which ultimately generate our contingent physical cosmos of 
change and multiplicity. 
Divine knowledge (ʿilm ladunī): "Inspired knowledge", or "knowledge derived from the 
presence of God", mystical comprehension–inspired by an encounter with God–of things 
spiritual. 
gnosis (ʿīrfān): gnosis (ma‘rifa), which has as its practical prerequisite spiritual exercises 
that prepare the heart to receive an influx of divinely bestowed illumination. 
habitual intellect (ʿaql bil malaka): the ‘habitual’ intellect” is potential intellect that has 
now developed the ability to grasp and employ universals in thought, yet is not 
perpetually doing so. 
holy intellect (ʿaql qudsī): holy intellect – as the reception of intelligibles by the 
imagination – within the context of an Aristotelian/ Neoplatonic worldview. 
illumination (ishrāq): illumination is direct experience of something, and we do not need 
to use any abstract concepts to understand our experience. 
in which one sees through the multiplicity of the manifest world and experiences its 
ontological unity, is followed by ‘perpetuation’ (baqa’), a state in which one sees the 
world with ‘two eyes’, as it were – simultaneously recognizing one’s creaturely 
uniqueness even as one also sees one’s unity with God. 
innate disposition (istʿidād): Capacity, power, actual (bi’l-fi‘l) or potential (bi’l-quwwah) 
possessed by a thing either to act in a certain manner or to suffer a certain change; it may 
be innate or acquired. 
potential intellect (ʿaql bil quwah): the ‘potential’ or ‘material’ intellect is the human 
being’s innate capacity for receiving intelligible, universal forms. It is not literally 
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corporeal, as the name might suggest, but rather simply a kind of un-actualized 
potentiality. 
Taste(dhawq): mystical experience. 
universal soul (nafs kulī): The universal soul inclusive of all the individual souls; 
corresponds to the Psyche of Plotinus. 
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